Matthew Bender & (and) Co. v. West Publishing Co.: The End of West\u27s Legal Publishing Empire by Petretti, Vito
Volume 43 Issue 4 Article 3 
1998 
Matthew Bender & (and) Co. v. West Publishing Co.: The End of 
West's Legal Publishing Empire 
Vito Petretti 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Vito Petretti, Matthew Bender & (and) Co. v. West Publishing Co.: The End of West's Legal Publishing 
Empire, 43 Vill. L. Rev. 873 (1998). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss4/3 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
1998]
MATTHEW BENDER & CO. v. WEST PUBLISHING CO.:
THE END OF WEST'S LEGAL PUBLISHING EMPIRE?
1. INTRODUCTION
Legal publishing has grown into a multi-billion dollar industry.1 West
Publishing Company ("West") 2 has managed to rise to the top of the in-
dustry with annual sales of approximately one billion dollars.3 One reason
for West's success has been its popular system of organizing and arranging
cases.4 Another reason for West's profitability is that it possesses "a virtual
1. See HyperLaw's Motion for Summary Judgment at 23, Matthew Bender &
Co. v. West Publ'g Co., Inc., No. 94 CIV. 0589, 1997 WL 266972 (S.D.N.Y. May 19,
1997) (stating that West has controlled multi-billion dollar legal publishing mar-
ket), available at <http://www.hyperlaw.com/hlsjfin.htm>; see also John E. Morris,
How West was Won, AM. LAW., Sept. 1996, at 73, 75-76 (estimating there is "a $2.7
billion market for legal research materials, including books, CD-ROM publica-
tions, and on-line legal services").
2. See West Group Will Merge Online and CD-ROM Search Engines into a Single
Legal Research Tool, Project Code-Named 'Trinity,'PR NEwswIRE, Mar. 17, 1997, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (discussing West's name change). In
June 1996, West Publishing Co. merged with Thomson Legal Publishing to form
the West Group. See id. Thomson, which already owned Lawyers Cooperative Pub-
lishing Company, purchased West for $3.4 billion. See generally Seven Attorneys Gen-
eral, DOJ Antitrust Division Require Thomson Corp., West Publishing Co. to Restructure
$3.4 Billion Merger, NAT'L ASS'N ATT'Ys GEN. ANTITRUST REP., May/June 1996.
3. See Daniel Wise, $3.4 Billion Merger of Legal Publishers Cleared by U.S..Judge,
N.Y. L.J., Feb. 28, 1997, at I available in LEXIS, LEGNEW Library, NYLAWJ File
(estimating West Group's revenues to be $1.2 billion in United States). West's
revenues for 1996 were in excess of $825 million. See generally INFORMATION INTEL-
LIGENCE, INC. ONLINE NEWSLETTER, April 1, 1996. Thomson's revenues from its
own various legal publications has been estimated to be $368 million. See id.
4. See Michelle D. Orton, House Bill 1822: New Anti-Westopoly Rule Proposed In
Congress, 7 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 308, 308 (1997) (stating part of West's
success is result of West's organization and arrangement of cases). The use of
West's system allows courts and practitioners to cite to one set of materials. See id.
The result has been the creation of a common system of citation. See id. Even
though a common system of citation is favored for reasons of ease and efficiency,
"preference for a common system has practically eliminated any possibility of com-
petition." Id.
Because of this lack of competition, some of West's critics have called for a
new system of citation. See id. (discussing initiatives to "reform citation methods").
In May of 1995, Representative Barney Frank of Massachusetts proposed a bill that
would radically alter the current system of citation. See id. The bill would "permit
lawyers to cite to any set of volumes where cases are published, and not just to
West's volumes." Id. This proposal was made in response to West's "virtual mo-
nopoly" in the case reporting industry. See id. The chances of this bill actually
becoming law, however, appear to be remote. See id. (stating that proposed bill
"will most likely be stuck in committee indefinitely").
Congress' reluctance to pass legislation that would negatively affect West's po-
sition in the market can, in part, be explained by the fact that West is a powerful
lobbyist and financial contributor to many members of Congress. See generally Tom
Hamburger & Sharon Schmickle, Who Owns the Law?, West Publishing and the Courts,
(873)
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monopoly on the publishing of judicial opinions and other types of legal
materials."5 West has been able to maintain this monopoly through ag-
gressive use of the legal system and profitable licensing agreements with
other legal publishers. 6 Recently, however, in Matthew Bender & Co. v. West
Publishing Co.,7 the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York dealt West's monopoly a potentially fatal blow by ruling that
West cannot claim a copyright in the page numbers of its reporters or in
the court opinions that it publishes.8
The issue regarding the extent of copyright protection afforded case
reporters dates back to the United States Supreme Court's 1848 decision
in Wheaton v. Peters.9 Despite a number of cases discussing the extent of
copyright protection afforded to case reporters in the period between
Wheaton and Bender, the issue has never been fully resolved. 10 In fact, the
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE, Mar. 6, 1995, at IA (discussing West's financial contri-
butions to members of Congress). For instance, between January 1, 1989 and
June 30, 1994, West donated at least $848,000 to the political process. See id.
5. Orton, supra note 4, at 308; Jol Silversmith, Universal Citation: The Fullest
Possible Dissemination of Judgments, COLLEGE HILL INTERNET LEGAL PRAc. NEWSL.
(May 19, 1997) <http://www.collegehill.com/ilp-news> ("West currently has a de
facto monopoly on the print and electronic databases of most United States court
opinions, with correspondingly high prices"); see also John H. Wyman, Comment,
Freeing the Law: Case Reporter Copyright and the Universal Citation System, 24 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv. 217, 246 (1996) (arguing West exerts "quasi-monopolistic control over ac-
cess to law"). But see Robert Berring, On Not Throwing Out the Baby: Planning the
Future of Legal Information, 83 CAL. L. REv. 615, 624 (1995) ("By no means does
West have a stranglehold on the publication of case materials."). According to one
commentator, there are many sources of case materials, but West's system has sur-
vived and grown because it is effective and relatively inexpensive. See id. (discuss-
ing "parallel systems" for case reporting). Proof of the fact that there is a
competitive market is the growing popularity of LEXIS. Cf id. (stating that LEXIS
is accepted as standard, reliable information source).
6. See Wyman, supra note 5, at 221 (stating that West's "quasi-monopoly is fur-
ther buttressed by West's aggressive defense of its copyright claim"). West claims
to have a protectable interest in its reporters, as well as its other publications, and
"routinely brings infringement actions" against would-be competitors. See Orton,
supra note 4, 322; see also Wyman, supra note 5, at 246 (commenting that threat of
West law suit precludes potential competitors from entering market). As a result,
West's competitors enter into licensing and royalty agreements with West to gain
access to West's material and avoid litigation. See id. at 245-46. One commentator
has argued that through threats of potential litigation and the prohibitively expen-
sive licensing fees, West has been able to maintain a monopoly over access to the
law and inhibit the progress of "legal science." See id.
7. No. 94 CIV. 0589, 1997 WL 266972 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1997).
8. See id. at *5.
9. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). For a detailed discussion of Wheaton, see infra
notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
10. Compare Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321,
1329 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that page numbers of case reporter are not pro-
tected by copyright), with West Publ'g Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219,
1223 (8th Cir. 1986) (deciding that page numbers are protected by copyright as
reflection of arrangement of cases), and Oasis Publ'g Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 924 F.
Supp. 918, 925 (D. Minn. 1996) (holding that page numbers of case reporters
"share[ ] in any copyright protection in the arrangement itself").
[Vol. 43: p. 873
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proper scope of copyright protection given to case reporters, and factual
compilations in general, has puzzled courts for quite some time."1 While
the Supreme Court, in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,1 2
attempted to end the confusion, some questions still remain. 13 The Bender
decision is one court's answer to an important question left open by the
Court in Feist, specifically, how much copyright protection remains for fac-
tual compilations?14 For West, the answer was painfully clear; not much
protection is left at all.' 5 In this sense, Bendercan be viewed as symbolic of
the recent movement in copyright law, since Feist, towards diminished pro-
tection for factual compilations. 16
This Note discusses West's position as the dominant legal publisher in
light of this recent defeat and the potential effects of the decision on the
legal profession. Part II discusses the development of copyright law as it
relates to legal publications. 17 Part III summarizes the facts and proce-
dural history of Bender.18 Additionally, Part III considers the approach
11. See William S. Strong, Database Protection After Feist v. Rural Telephone Co.,
42J. COPYMGHT Soc'x U.S.A. 39, 39 (1994) (stating that "question of what protec-
tion should be given to compilations of facts has bedeviled the law of copyright for
decades").
12. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
13. See Strong, supra note 11, at 39 (arguing that Feist left task of developing "a
coherent framework for protecting compilations" to lower courts). For a further
discussion of the ambiguities of Feist, see infra note 83.
14. SeeJane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection of
Databases in the United States and Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 151, 151 (1997) (discuss-
ing implications of Feist decision). For a discussion of the Bender decision, see infra
notes 146-98 and accompanying text.
15. See generally Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., No. 94 CIV. 0589,
1997 WL 266972 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1997) (holding that copying cases directly from
West's reporters did not violate West's copyright). After Bender, only West's head-
notes and key numbers are protected by copyright. See id. at *1 (stating that head-
notes and key numbers were not at issue in case).
16. Cf 143 CONG. REC. E2000-02 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Coble) ("[Liower court decisions have underscored that [since Feist] copyright
cannot stop a competitor from lifting massive amounts of factual material from a
copyrighted collection to sue as the basis for its own competing product."). Com-
pare West Publ'g Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1223 (8th Cir. 1986)
(finding that page numbers of case reporters were protected by copyright), and
Hutchinson Tel. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128, 132 (8th Cir. 1985)
(holding that listings in telephone directory were protected by copyright), with
BellSouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ'g, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436,
1446 (lth Cir. 1993) (ruling that listings in yellow pages were not protected by
copyright), and Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321,
1330 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that page numbers of case reporters were not pro-
tected by copyright).
17. For a discussion of copyright law as it relates to legal publications, see
infra notes 23-118 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the facts and procedural history of Bender, see infra
notes 119-45 and accompanying text. For a discussion and analysis of the decision
of the district court in Bender, see infra notes 146-254 and accompanying text.
19981 NOTE 875
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that other courts have taken in dealing with West's copyright claims. 19
Part IV discusses the court's reasoning in holding that West did not have a
protectable interest in the page numbers of its reporters or the cases it
publishes, concluding that the court appropriately decided that West's
copyright does not protect the page numbers of its reporters or the text of
the judicial decisions it publishes.20 Finally, Part V details the possible
impact of the court's decision, focusing on the potential ramifications for
the legal publishing market and the cost of legal research. 2 1 Part V also
discusses Bender's impact on the copyright protection afforded to factual
compilations and databases, as well as the recent congressional initiatives
that address the issue. 22
II. BACKGROUND-COPYRIGHTING THE LAW
A. Copyright Law and Legal Publishing Before 1976
1. The United States Constitution and Copyright
The United States Constitution states that Congress has the power "to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." 23 This language suggests that the framers of
the Constitution had three goals in mind when they created Congress'
power to grant copyrights: "(1) [to] promote learning ('the Progress of
Science'); (2) [to] secure the author's right to profit from their work ('ex-
clusive Right'); and (3) [to] enhance the public domain ('limited
Times')."2 4 By granting authors the right to receive financial benefits
19. For a discussion of the approach that other courts have taken in dealing
with West's copyright claims, see infra notes 97-118 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the court's holding in Bender and the rationale under-
lying its decision, see infra notes 146-98 and accompanying text. For a critical anal-
ysis of the court's decision in Bender, see infra notes 199-254 and accompanying
text.
21. For a discussion of the impact of Bender, see infra notes 255-93 and accom-
panying text.
22. For a discussion of Bender's impact on copyright protection afforded to
factual compilations and databases, see infra notes 273-74. For a discussion of re-
cent congressional initiatives dealing with the copyright status of factual compila-
tions, see infra notes 276-91.
23. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
24. L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright
Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. REv. 719, 783
(1989); cf Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (stating philosophy behind
copyright clause of Constitution was idea "that encouragement of individual [au-
thor's] effort[s] by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare").
The first goal, "'the Progress of Science[,]' . . . is the premier doctrine of
copyright law." Patterson & Joyce, supra, at 783. Copyright was meant to en-
courage authors to create works, "without which learning would be less, and soci-
ety the poorer." Id. at 783-84. An important aspect of the promotion of learning is
that the monopoly given must be limited, because monopoly is contrary to learn-
ing. See id. at 786 (discussing need for public access to information).
876 [Vol. 43: p. 873
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from their creations, the framers hoped to encourage authors to create
and publish their literary and artistic works. 25 The framers believed these
creations would enhance public welfare "through the talents of authors
and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.'"26 With this framework in
mind, the Supreme Court decided the first legal publishing case, Wheaton
v. Peters.
2 7
2. Wheaton v. Peters
Wheaton was not only the Supreme Court's first legal publishing case,
it was also the Court's first decision on copyright law.28 Peters, the fourth
Reporter of Decisions for the United States Supreme Court, condensed
his predecessor's twenty-five volumes into a six-volume set.29 Peters's con-
densed version contained the facts of the cases and the opinions of the
The second goal of the copyright clause is to secure the author's right to
profit from his or her work. See id. at 783. Copyright encourages the creation of
new works by securing the author an "exclusive Right" to that work which allows
the author to profit from the creation. See id. at 787 (noting framers' decision to
distinguish authors from publishers). It has been noted that "exclusive Right" as
used in the copyright clause does not mean an unlimited monopoly. See id. (ex-
plaining meaning of "exclusive Right" in copyright clause). The word "exclusive"
has a more limited meaning when considered in the context in which the copy-
right clause was adopted:
[C]opyright in eighteenth century usage denoted an exclusive right of
"printing, publishing and vending." Thus, the right given to the "Author"
by the copyright clause was the right, at least initially, to publish and sell
his [or her] writings. And, being a gift to the author only, this constitu-
tionally protected right was, by definition, "exclusive" against the world,
including publishers.
Id. (footnote omitted).
The third and final goal of the copyright clause is to enhance the public do-
main. See id. at 783. To accomplish this goal, the framers of the Constitution lim-
ited Congress' power by permitting it to grant copyrights only "for limited Times."
See id. at 790 (noting that limitation would increase number of works in public
domain and arguing that "[this] is as significant to the cause of learning as the
creation and distribution of new works").
25. See Christine Wallace, Note, Overlapping Interests in Derivative Works and
Compilations, 35 CASE W. Rs. L. REv. 103, 105-06 (1985) (discussing purpose of
copyright clause); see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 546 (1985) ("'The monopoly created by copyright... rewards the indi-
vidual in order to benefit the public."' (quoting Sony Corp. v. Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984))).
26. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219.
27. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
28. See Wyman, supra note 5, at 221-22 (describing Wheaton as Supreme
Court's first decision involving copyright law).
29. See CraigJoyce, The Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspec-
tive on Marshall Court Ascendancy, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1291, 1363-64 (1985) (explain-
ing Peters's business ventures). Peters's condensed version could be produced for
less than a third of the price of the original 25 volumes. See Wyman, supra note 5,
at 221.
87719981 NOTE
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Supreme Court.30 Wheaton, the Court's third reporter, filed a bill in eq-
uity seeking to enjoin Peters from further publication of Peters's Condensed
Reports.3 1 Wheaton claimed that Peters's publication infringed on Whea-
ton's copyright.3 2 The Court ruled in favor of Peters, stating that "no re-
porter... can have any copyright in the written opinions delivered by this
court. 3 3 With this holding, the Court established the "bedrock" policy
that "the public should have maximum access to the law."3 4
3. Banks Law Publishing Co. v. Lawyers' Co-operative Publishing Co.
In Banks Law Publishing Co. v. Lawyers' Co-operative Publishing Co.,35 the
Second Circuit addressed the issue of whether a case reporter's arrange-
ment and pagination is subject to copyright law.3 6 The Banks Law Pub-
lishing Company ("Banks") published the United States Reports, the official
30. SeeJoyce, supra note 29, at 1358. The plaintiff, Henry Wheaton, was the
third Reporter of Decisions. See Patterson & Joyce, supra note 24, at 731. Peters's
six-volume set included the reprinted version of 12 volumes of Wheaton's Reports.
See id.
31. SeeJoyce, supra note 29, at 1370.
32. See id. Wheaton contended that "an author's natural (or 'common law')
right, exist[ed] independently of statute and continu[ed] in perpetuity." Patter-
son & Joyce, supra note 24, at 732. Wheaton was forced to argue for a "common
law" copyright because it was doubtful whether he had complied with the require-
ments of the copyright statutes. See id. at 732 n.41.
Peters, on the other hand, argued that copyright was solely "the grant of a
statutory monopoly, limited in both scope and duration by the terms of the grant."
See id. at 732. The Supreme Court sided with Peters, finding that the federal copy-
right statute protected published works and the common law copyright that Whea-
ton argued for applied only to unpublished works. See id. The Court also stated
that the copyright statute granted only a limited monopoly for a limited period.
See id. Finally, the Court stated that an author must strictly comply with the terms
of the statute to secure the benefit of copyright. See id. "In short, statutory copy-
right is a monopoly grant awarded primarily for the benefit of the public rather
than the author and, for that reason, is attended by appropriate limitations and
conditions regulating both its length and scope." Id. at 732-33.
33. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 668 (1834). Although there was a
split in the Court on other issues, the Court was unanimous with respect to this
important point. See id. The holding in Wheaton was later expanded, in Banks v.
Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888), to deny copyright protection for state reporters as
well. See Wyman, supra note 5, at 223 (stating that Banks court denied copyright to
official state reporter).
34. See Patterson & Joyce, supra note 24, at 742. While the Court's reasoning
in Wheaton is not completely clear, the overall effect of the decision can not be
overstated:
The impact of the Court's opinion was sudden and extensive. Where case
reporters had once been scarce because of the inflated prices charged by
the owners of copyrights in the volumes, publishers around the country
now raced to put out their own, presumably lower-priced editions. The
law was thus more readily available to the citizenry than ever before.
Wyman, supra note 5, at 223 (footnote omitted).
35. 169 F. 386 (2d Cir. 1909).
36. See Wyman, supra note 5, at 225 (discussing facts of, and Second Circuit's
decision in, Lawyers' Co-operative).
[Vol. 43: p. 873
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reporter of the United States Supreme Court.3 7 Lawyers' Co-operative
Publishing Company ("Lawyers' Co-operative") began producing low-cost
sets of Supreme Court reports that contained star pagination to Banks's
United States Reports.38 Banks sued, claiming Lawyers' Co-operative had vio-
lated its copyright.
39
The trial court specifically addressed the copyrightability of case ar-
rangement and pagination. 40 In its decision, the trial court stated that the
sequence of cases and the pagination of the volumes were not features of a
reporter that were entitled to copyright protection.4 1 In affirming the
trial court's decision, the Second Circuit stated that "the arrangement of
reported cases in sequence, their paging and distribution into volumes,
are not features of such importance as to entitle the reporter to copyright
protection of such details."
4 2
B. Copyright Law and Legal Publishing After 1976
1. The Copyright Act of 1976
The Copyright Act of 197643 ("1976 Act") is more sophisticated and
comprehensive than its predecessors, the Copyright Act of 190944 and the
Copyright Revision Acts of 187045 and 1831.46 First, the 1976 Act does not
37. See Lawyers' Co-operative, 169 F. at 386.
38. See Wyman, supra note 5, at 225-26. Lawyers' Co-operative attempted to
take advantage of new technology involving stereotype plates in order to supply
consumers with cheaper versions of Supreme Court decisions. See id. In 1882, a
complete set of 103 volumes of Banks' United States Reports cost about $500. See
THOMAS A. WOXLAND & PATrI J. OGDEN, LANDMARKS IN AMERICAN LEGAL PUBLISH-
ING 41 (1990) (discussing price difference between Banks's product and Lawyers'
Co-operative's). Lawyers' Co-operative, on the other hand, was able to sell each
volume for one dollar. See id. Banks was in the same position as West is today in
that the use of star pagination by Lawyers' Co-operative would allow a person to
purchase the cheaper product and still cite to the "official" reporter. See Patterson
& Joyce, supra note 24, at 740 n.72. Therefore, Lawyers' Co-operative eliminated
the need for a consumer to purchase Banks's products. See id. (discussing factual
similarities between Lawyers' Co-operative and Bender).
39. See Lawyers' Co-operative, 169 F. at 386. Banks claimed infringement, on the
part of Lawyers' Co-operative, "arising Out of the arrangement of the cases, the
division into volumes, the table of cases, and the numerical or star pagination to
indicate where in the official reports the different cases and points decided may be
found." Id.
40. See id. at 388.
41. See id. at 390 ("It is inconceivable to me that to merely arrange the cases in
sequence . . .and paging the volumes ... are features or characteristics of such
importance as to entitle him to copyright protection of such details.").
42. Id. at 391.
43. 1976 General Revision of Copyright Law ("1976 Act"), Pub. L. No. 94-553,
90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1994)).
44. Act of Mar. 4, 1909 ("1909 Act"), ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976).
45. Act of July 8, 1870 ("1870 Act"), ch. 230, §§ 85-111, 16 Stat. 198, 212-17
(repealed 1909).
46. Act of Feb. 3, 1831 ("1831 Act"), ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (amended 1870).
There are several differences between the 1976 Act and the earlier copyright stat-
8791998] NOTE
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give copyright protection to works of the United States Government.4 7
Second, the 1976 Act defines and limits protection for compilations and
derivative works. 48 Third and finally, the 1976 Act requires an original
work of authorship as a condition for copyright. 49
a. Government Works
Section 105 of the 1976 Act states that copyright protection is not
available for any work of the United States Government.50 A work of the
United States Government is any "work prepared by an officer or em-
ployee of the United States Government as part of that person's official
duties."5 1 Because section 105 is applicable to "any" work of the govern-
ment, all official records of the United States are in the public domain. 52
utes. See Patterson & Joyce, supra note 24, at 750-51 (discussing differences be-
tween 1976 Act and earlier statutes). One commentator has stated that the 1976
Act is the first U.S. copyright statute "which truly encourages the publication of
new works." Wallace, supra note 25, at 106. In contrast to its predecessors, the
1976 Act provides protection to a work from the time it is created, therefore en-
abling an author to realize the work's full economic value. See id. at 105-10.
47. See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (stating that "[c]opyright protection ... is not avail-
able for any work of the United States Government"). Neither the 1831 nor the
1870 Acts expressly denied protection for works of the United States Government.
See Patterson & Joyce, supra note 24, at 750. The 1976 Act, however, directly ad-
dresses the applicability of copyright law to federal cases and statutes "by providing
that 'copyright protection ... is not available' for such works." Id. at 756-57 (quot-
ing 17 U.S.C. § 105) (alteration in original).
48. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (defining compilations and derivative works and
limiting protection available to such works). Neither the 1831 nor the 1870 Acts
defined or limited copyright protection for derivative works or compilations. See
Patterson & Joyce, supra note 24, at 750. On the other hand, the 1909 Act in-
cluded "an author's right to abridge his work.., and 'to make any other version
thereof."' Wallace, supra note 25, at 109 (quoting Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320
§ 1 (b), 353 Stat. 1075). The 1909 Act also limited these rights to "literary works."
See id. at 109 n.47. The 1976 Act extended protection for derivative works to all
copyrightable work. See id. at 109-10 (comparing 1976 Act to 1909 Act). For a
further discussion of copyright and compilations, see infra notes 55-60 and accom-
panying text. For a further discussion of derivative works and copyright, see infra
notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
49. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (stating that 1976 Act protects "original works of au-
thorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression"). Neither the 1831 Act nor
the 1870 Act required the condition that a work be an original work of authorship
to warrant copyright protection. See Patterson &Joyce, supra note 24, at 750. For a
further discussion of the "original work of authorship" requirement, see infra
notes 68-96 and accompanying text.
50. See 17 U.S.C. § 105 ("Copyright protection under this title is not available
for any work of the United States Government .. "). The government, however,
"is not precluded from receiving and holding copyrights transferred to it by assign-
ment, bequest, or otherwise." Id.
51. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
52. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 5.06[A], at 5-81 (explaining that all official records of government cannot be
protected by copyright because of § 105 and therefore are in public domain). This
rule is true for all federal judicial opinions as well. See id. § 5.06[C], at 5-90 (citing
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834)).
8
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While on its face the 1976 Act appears applicable only to works of the
federal government, it applies to some state works as well. 5 3 The rule is
that both state judicial opinions and state statutes are part of the public
domain. 54
b. Compilations
Section 103(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides that copyright
law protects compilations and derivative works.5 5 A compilation is defined
as "a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materi-
als or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that
the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of author-
ship."56 In order for a factual compilation to be copyrightable, three ele-
ments must be present: (1) collection and assembly of preexisting
material; (2) selection, coordination or arrangement of that material; and
(3) creation of an original work of authorship, by virtue of that selection,
coordination or arrangement. 57
The fact that there are three requirements implies that not every col-
lection of facts is entitled to copyright protection. 58 Prior to 1991, how-
53. See Patterson & Joyce, supra note 24, at 756-57 (discussing application of
§ 105 to works of state governments, specifically state cases and statutes). In 1888,
the Supreme Court ruled that judges, as a matter of public policy, are incapable of
being "authors." See Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888). The 1976 Act
made no attempt to overrule Banks, therefore, "it follows that [the Banks] rule now
extends to state judicial opinions and reports by reason of sections 102 and 103,
which allow copyright only for 'original works of authorship."' Patterson & Joyce,
supra note 24, at 757.
54. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 52, § 5.06[C], at 5-90 (discussing rules
applicable to state judicial opinions and state statutes).
55. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) ("The subject matter of copyright... includes com-
pilations and derivative works .. "). The 1976 Act provides for protection of both
factual compilations and computer databases. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 at 54,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667 (stating that literary works include "cata-
logs, directories, and similar factual, reference, or instructional works and compila-
tions of data" including computer databases).
56. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
57. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 357 (1991)
(identifying three distinct elements of compilations); see also Skinder-Strauss As-
socs. v. Massachusetts Continuing Legal Educ., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 665, 671 (D.
Mass. 1995) (holding that compilations are copyrightable if three elements are
present); National Rifle Ass'n v. Handgun Control Fed'n, 844 F. Supp. 1178, 1180
(N.D. Ohio 1992), affid, 15 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 1994) (same). For a detailed discus-
sion of the "original work of authorship" requirement, see infra notes 68-96 and
accompanying text.
58. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 357 (concluding that existence of three requirements
indicates that not every collection of facts will receive copyright protection). In
discussing the three requirements, the Supreme Court noted the particular impor-
tance of the third requirement. See id. Because § 102 requires originality for all
works, the Court concluded that Congress intended fact-based works to be held to
the same standard as all other works. See id.
The Court stated that the second requirement, selection, coordination or ar-
rangement, is the guide by which fact-based works should be judged. See id. at 358.
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ever, confusion existed in the courts as to which compilations merited
copyright protection.5 9 The Supreme Court, in Feist, attempted to end the
confusion by holding that a compilation is entitled to copyright protection
only if it is "selected, coordinated, or arranged 'in such a way' as to render
the work as a whole original. '60
Because facts can never, by themselves, be the subject of copyright, "the compila-
tion author can claim originality, if at all, only in the way the facts are presented.
To that end, the statute dictates that the principal focus should be on whether the
selection, coordination, and arrangement are sufficiently original to merit protec-
tion." Id.
59. See id. at 351-52 (discussing confusion regarding protection of factual
compilations); see also Howard B. Abrams, Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law,
55 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 7 (1992) (stating that prior to Feist, "the question of
what constituted the requisite originality... [had] prove[n] troublesome for the
courts"). Most of the confusion among the lower courts involved the level of origi-
nality needed for a work to gain copyright protection. See Feist, 340 U.S. at 351
(stating that statute implicitly incorporated originality requirement "thereby leav-
ing room for error"). In Feist, the Court stated that "originality is a constitutionally
mandated prerequisite for copyright protection." Id. Most courts followed this
principle, but ambiguity in the 1909 Act led some courts to ignore the originality
component of copyright protection. See id. at 352 (noting that "some courts mis-
understood the statute"). In this confusion, a number of lower courts developed a
new test to justify protecting factual compilations, known as either the "sweat of
the brow" or "industrious collection" test. See id. By the time of the Feist decision,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh, Eighth and Tenth Circuits had
adopted the "sweat of the brow" test. See Daniel A. Davis, Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Service Co.: Opening the Door to Information Pirates?, 36 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 439, 442 n.19 (1991) (discussing application of "sweat of the brow" doc-
trine). For an explanation of the "sweat of the brow" test, see infra note 60.
60. Feist, 499 U.S. at 358. In Feist, the Court specifically rejected the "sweat of
the brow" doctrine. See id. (concluding that there is "no doubt that originality, not
'sweat of the brow' is the touchstone of copyright protection in . .. fact-based
works"). Courts that applied the "sweat of the brow" standard equated originality
with industriousness. SeeJane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright
Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1865, 1875 (1990) (discussing
concept of laborious authorship in relation to copyright protection). "The sweat
of the brow theory allows copyright protection for an entire factual compilation
based upon the cost, effort, and labor invested in the creation." Tracy Lea Meade,
Note, Ex-Post Feist: Applications of a Landmark Copyright Decision, 2 J. INTELL. PROP.
L. 245, 248 (1994). The root of the "sweat of the brow" doctrine can be traced
back to English copyright law. See id. The doctrine as applied in the United States
was described by the Second Circuit in Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone
Publishing Co., 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922):
The right to copyright a book upon which one has expended labor in its
preparation does not depend upon whether the materials which he [or
she] has collected consist or not of matters which are publici juris, or
whether such materials show literary skill or originality, either in thought
or in language, or anything more than industrious collection.
Id. at 88.
Under this logic, even the most unoriginal compilations, such as a telephone
directory, could be entitled to copyright protection if the compiler exerted
enough of an effort in compiling the facts. See United Tel. Co. v. Johnson Publ'g
Co., 855 F.2d 604, 612-13 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding that copying phone directory
constituted infringement of publisher's copyright); see also Leon v. Pacific Tel. &
Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 487 (9th Cir. 1937) (same).
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c. Derivative Works
Section 103(a) of the 1976 Act extends copyright protection to deriva-
tive works.6 ' A derivative work is defined as:
[A] work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization,
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction,
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work
may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of edi-
torial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifica-
tions, which as a whole, represent an original work of authorship
62
For a derivative work to qualify for copyright protection, it must consist of
two elements: (1) preexisting materials that are subject to a prior author's
copyright or are in the public domain and (2) original material that can
be protected by a separate copyright.63
While there is some overlap between derivative works and compila-
tions, they represent different concepts.64 A derivative work requires a
process of adapting, transforming or recasting one or more preexisting
works. 65 A compilation, on the other hand, is the result of selecting, or-
In rejecting the "sweat of the brow" doctrine, the Supreme Court stated that it
had a number of flaws. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 353. The most glaring error of the
doctrine was that it expanded copyright protection to the facts of a compilation,
not merely to the selection or arrangement of those facts. See id. at 353-54. In
doing so, the courts that applied the doctrine "eschewed the most fundamental
axiom of copyright law-that no one may copyright facts or ideas." Id. at 353.
In Feist, the Court rejected the claim that copying a compilation of facts was
unfair to the compiler. See id. at 350. The Court asserted that "raw facts may be
copied at will. This result is neither unfair nor unfortunate. It is the means by
which copyright advances the progress of science and art." Id. By rejecting the
"sweat of the brow" doctrine, the Court made it clear that the primary goal of
copyright is to promote the progress of science, not to reward an author's labor.
Cf id. For a further discussion of the originality requirement, see infra notes 69-97
and accompanying text.
61. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1994) ("The subject matter of copyright ... in-
cludes .. .derivative works .....
62. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
63. See Wallace, supra note 25, at 103 (identifying two elements of derivative
works). It is also important to note that the derivative work must substantially bor-
row from the preexisting material. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 52, § 3.01, at
3-3 ("A work is not derivative unless it has substantially copied from a prior work.").
For a work to be copyrightable as a derivative work, it would have to infringe an
author's copyright. See id. In other words, the derivative author must actually copy
the original author's expression of ideas. See id. The only reason why it would not
actually infringe a copyright is if the derivative author has the permission of the
original author or the work is in the public domain. See id.
64. See H.R. REP. No. 89-2237, at 48 (1966) (stating that despite some overlap,
derivative works and compilations represent different concepts).
65. See id. (defining and explaining meaning of derivative work). In this con-
text, preexisting work means a work that is covered by "the general subject matter
of copyright" as defined by 17 U.S.C. § 102. See id. (explaining meaning of "preex-
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ganizing and arranging preexisting materials. 66 In either case, the scope
of the copyright is limited to "the material contributed by the author of
such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the
work." 6 7
d. Original Work of Authorship
The 1976 Act was the first copyright statute to explicitly require origi-
nality as a condition to copyright. 68 According to section 102(a), copy-
right protection applies to works that represent an "original work[ ] of
authorship."69 The originality requirement, however, is not particularly
stringent and requires little innovation.70 Courts have interpreted origi-
nality to consist of two basic components: independent creation and crea-
tivity.7 1 The requirement that a work be an independent creation is
isting work"). The concept has also been expanded to include works that have
entered the public domain. See, e.g., Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Rosstex Fabrics, Inc.,
733 F. Supp. 174, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("[1It is clear that a work is derivative only if
it takes from a work already covered by copyright or which is in the public domain.")
(citing NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 52, § 3.01, at 3-3) (emphasis added).
66. See H.R. RiP. No. 89-2237, at 48 (explaining meaning and requirements of
compilation).
67. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1994).
68. See Wallace, supra note 25, at 110-11 (stating that, while courts had previ-
ously incorporated originality requirement into copyright analysis, 1976 Act was
first statute to explicitly recognize requirement); see also Brian A. Dahl, Originality
and Creativity in Reporter Pagination: A Contradiction in Terms?, 74 IowA L. REv. 713,
716 (1989) (commenting that codified requirement of originality is "unparalleled
in statutory copyright history"). While the 1976 Act was the first statute to require
originality, courts had required originality well before 1976. See id. ("The Supreme
Court, prior to the enactment of section 102, interpreted the copyright clause as
demanding some quantum of originality."). The 1976 Act was simply an attempt
to codify the concept as it had previously been applied by the courts. See Wallace,
supra note 25, at 111.
69. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) ("Copyright protection subsists . . . in origi-
nal works of authorship.").
70. See Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358 (1991)
(noting that originality requires only "some minimal level of creativity"); see also
Dahl, supra note 68, at 716 (stating that originality standard requires little innova-
tion because work need "only be distinguishable from prior works and involve
minimal creativity"). Originality is not difficult to achieve; all that it requires is
that the work contains some element that is not copied from another source and
that the work displays a minimal degree of creativity. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 358
(discussing elements of originality requirement). In this context, originality does
not require novelty, as patent law does. See Wallace, supra note 25, at 111.
While this standard is apparently easy to meet, not all works will satisfy the
originality requirement. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 358-59 ("Presumably the vast major-
ity of compilations will pass this test, but not all will."). The Feist Court noted that
there is "a narrow category of works in which the creative spark is utterly lacking or
so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent." Id. at 359 (citing Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903)).
71. See, e.g., Feist, 499 U.S. at 358 (explaining that originality requires that
work is independently created and possesses minimal degree of creativity); Lipton
v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 470 (2d Cir. 1995) (same); Kregos v. Associated Press,
937 F.2d 700, 704 (2d Cir. 1991) (same). The Feist Court held that this two-pro-
884 [Vol. 43: p. 873
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simply "'a prohibition of actual copying."' 72 The prohibition of copying,
however, does not amount to a requirement of novelty or striking
uniqueness.
73
The creativity requirement has not been as easy to define.
74
Although the 1976 Act does not mention the word creativity, the Supreme
Court established the creativity standard as a supplement to originality.
75
While the creativity standard is relatively low, it is an essential element in
the effort to protect nondescript works.7 6 Despite its increasing impor-
nged test of originality is required under the United States Constitution. See
Abrams, supra note 59, at 14 (stating that Feist held two-step analysis to determine
originality was "constitutionally mandated").
72. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc. 191 F.2d 99, 103 (1951) (quot-
ing Hoague-Sprague Corp. v. Frank C. Meyer, Inc., 31 F.2d 583, 586 (E.D.N.Y.
1929)). This requirement is fairly easy to meet, because it only requires that the
author contribute something that is recognizable as his or her own. See id. at 102
("[N]othing in the Constitution commands that copyrighted matter be strikingly
unique or novel.").
73. SeeL. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976) (main-
taining that independent creation requirement does not require that work be
strikingly unique, ingenious or novel).
74. For a discussion of the problems in defining the standard of originality,
see infra notes 75-96 and accompanying text.
75. See Dahl, supra note 68, at 716 (discussing development of creativity re-
quirement). The Supreme Court elaborated on the creativity requirement in Feist.
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 358. In Feist, the Court held that original, as used in copyright,
means "that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to
copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of
creativity." Id. In this respect, Feist was consistent with earlier Supreme Court cases.
See, e.g., United States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (stating that writing must
be product of intellectual creativity to be protected by copyright). After Feist, other
courts have followed the Supreme Court's example, holding that creativity is an
essential element of originality. See Kregos, 937 F.2d at 704 (" [T] he requirement of
minimal creativity [is] an important ingredient of the test for copyright entitle-
ment."). But see, Russ VerSteeg, Sparks in the Tinderbox: Feist, "Creativity, and the
Legislative History of the 1976 Copyright Act, 56 U. Prrr. L. REv. 549, 550 (1995) (chal-
lenging Feist Court's conclusion that creativity is condition of copyrightability).
One commentator has argued that the legislative history of the 1976 Act sug-
gests that Congress rejected the creativity requirement in drafting the Act. See id.
at 550-51 ("The majority of those who spoke out about the issue during the draft-
ing process expressly rejected the inclusion of 'creativity' as a factor in the calculus
of copyrightability."). The tentative draft of the 1976 Act included the phrase
"original creative authorship." See id. at 558. That phrase, however, caused a great
deal of criticism, "[i]n fact, the negative comments were overwhelming." Id. In
response to this criticism, the final draft of the 1976 Act removed the word "crea-
tive" and simply used the term "original works of authorship," without further defi-
nition. See id. at 559.
76. See Dahl, supra note 68, at 717 (stating that "the creativity requirement is
minimal, but essential, to prevent the protection of nondescript efforts"). In dis-
cussing nondescript efforts, the Copyright Office Regulations state:
The following are examples of works not subject to copyright and applica-
tions for registration of such works cannot be entertained:
(a) Words and short phrases such as names, titles, and slogans; familiar
symbols or designs ... mere listing of ingredients or contents;
1998] NOTE 885
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tance, the creativity requirement remains difficult to define.7 7 In an effort
to define creativity, two distinct lines of authority have developed.
78
The first line of authority has developed through lower courts' inter-
pretations of the Supreme Court's decision in Feist.7 9 While the Court in
Feist held that a certain level of creativity was required for a work to be
copyrightable, it failed to establish guidelines that lower courts could fol-
low.80 In the absence of clear guidance from the Supreme Court, lower
(b) Ideas, plans, methods, systems, or devices, as distinguished from the
particular manner in which they are expressed or described in a writing;
(d) Works consisting entirely of information that is common property
containing no original authorship, such as ... lists or tables taken from
public documents or other common sources.
37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1988).
77. See Russ VerSteeg, Rethinking Originality, 34 WM. & MARY L. REv. 801, 810
(1993) (asserting that subjective element of originality, i.e., creativity, is "an elusive
concept that is difficult to quantify"). While courts continue to emphasize the
creativity requirement, "they have completely avoided defining what they mean by
the term 'creativity."' Id. at 818.
78. See id. (stating that in attempt to define creativity, "two dominant articula-
tions" have developed: 1) some degree of "creativity" standard and 2) trivial varia-
tion standard).
79. See id. at 818-24 (discussing Feist as paradigm of "some degree of creativity"
standard). Essentially this first line of authority has dealt with the creativity stan-
dard as it relates to compilations. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 340 (dealing with creativity
of compilations). The basic theories, however, apply equally to derivative claims.
See HyperLaw's Motion for Summary Judgment at 15, Matthew Bender & Co. v.
West Publ'g Co., Inc., No. 94 CIV. 0589, 1997 WL 266972 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1997),
available at <http://www.hyperlaw.com/hlsjfin.htm> (citing Feist as "starting point"
for copyright analysis); see also Meade, supra note 60, at 270 (stating that impact of
Feist decision extends beyond test for copyrightability of compilations; specifically,
the Court "announced a philosophy of copyright priorities that extends to all
works of authorship").
80. See VerSteeg, supra note 77, at 822 (stating that Feist Court did not define
creativity and failed to articulate one clear standard); see also Meade, supra note 60,
at 262 (stating that Feist did not establish test to be used to judge creativity). "In
short, the Supreme Court did not define 'creativity' in any manner other than by
default. Basically, it resorted to a form of name-calling. Items labeled as 'mechani-
cal,' 'entirely typical,' 'garden variety,' 'obvious,' and so on, fell short of demon-
strating a minimal degree of creativity." VerSteeg, supra note 77, at 823.
Instead of providing one definite standard, the Court added to the confusion
by using five different standards to determine the "modicum of creativity" stan-
dard. See id. at 823-24. One commentator has explained the five standards as:
1) whether the plaintiffs work "possesses at least some minimal degree of
creativity"; or 2) whether the plaintiff's work displayed "a modicum of
creativity." It then added negative formulations: 3) whether the plaintiff's
work was one in which "the creative spark is utterly lacking"; 4) whether
"the creative spark" existing in the plaintiff's work was "so trivial as to be
virtually nonexistent"; and 5) whether the plaintiff's work was "devoid of
even the slightest trace of creativity."
Id. at 823-24 (quoting Feist, 499 U.S. at 344, 346, 357-58, 361). But see Abrams,
supra note 59, at 16 (suggesting that examples used by Feist Court provide "a rela-
tively consistent theme that ultimately suggests a coherent limit for creativity
component").
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courts have focused on the terminology of the Court in Feist when it deter-
mined that the work in question was not creative.8 1 Key phrases, such as
"entirely typical" and "garden variety" were the only reasons given for de-
termining that the work was not sufficiently creative to be protected by
copyright.8 2 By focusing on these phrases, some courts have developed a
Because of the lack of clear guidance from the Supreme Court, some lower
courts have developed other standards to determine whether a work is sufficiently
creative to warrant copyright protection. See Meade, supra note 60, at 262 (discuss-
ing new standards developed by courts to determine whether work is creative). An
example of one of these new standards is the industry standard test. See id. Build-
ing on the negative guidelines of Feist, the industry standard test states that a work
is not creative if it is "typical" or "obvious" in a given field. See id. The Second
Circuit applied this test in Victor Lalli Enterprises v. Big Red Apple, 936 F.2d 671, 673
(2d Cir. 1991). In Victor Lalli, the court held that a horse racing chart was not
creative because the way in which it was organized was the norm for the industry.
See Meade, supra note 60, at 262.
81. See, e.g., Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991) (us-
ing phrases such as "entirely typical" and "garden variety" to determine whether
work was creative). For a further discussion of Kregos, see infra note 83.
82. See VerSteeg, supra note 77, at 823 (stating that "one can only assume"
from Feist which works are not creative). The issue in Feist involved a phone book
published by the plaintiff, Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc. See Feist, 499
U.S. at 343-44. Rural's phone book consisted of yellow and white pages. See id. at
342. The yellow pages listed Rural's business subscribers alphabetically by category
and displayed advertisements of various sizes. See id. The white pages consisted of
an alphabetical listing of Rural's subscribers, along with their telephone number
and the town in which they lived. See id. at 343. As the only telephone service in
the service area, it was very easy for Rural to obtain this information; subscribers
supplied Rural with their names and addresses in order to obtain telephone ser-
vice and Rural assigned the telephone numbers. See id.
Feist Publications Inc. was a publisher that specialized in area-wide telephone
directories. See id. Feist's directory, like Rural's, contained both yellow and white
pages, with the yellow pages containing various advertisements. See id. Feist and
Rural competed for yellow page advertising. See id. Feist's area-wide directories,
however, covered a much larger geographical area than typical directories that
cover a smaller calling area. See id. For example, the directory that was the subject
of the litigation covered 11 different telephone service areas. See id. To obtain
subscriber information, Feist approached each of the 11 telephone companies op-
erating in the area and offered to pay for the right to use its white page listings. See
id. Of the 11, Rural was the only phone company that refused to license its listings.
See id.
After Rural's refusal, Feist used the listings without Rural's consent. See id.
Feist did some extra investigating and added some material to each listing, such as
the subscribers' street address. See id. Despite the changes, 1309 of the 46,878
listings in Feist's directory were exactly the same as Rural's. See id. at 344. Rural
then sued Feist for copyright infringement. See id.
The Court decided that there was nothing even "remotely creative" about Ru-
ral's alphabetized listing of names and phone numbers in its phone book. See id. at
363. "Because Rural's white pages lack[ed] the requisite originality, Feist's use of
the listings [did not] constitute infringement." Id. The Court, however, failed to
explain the test it used to conclude that the work did not rise to the level of creativ-
ity needed for copyright protection. See VerSteeg, supra note 77, at 822 (stating
that Court in Feist did not explain its conclusion). The Court explained that the
selection of the names and phone numbers lacked the "modicum of creativity"
necessary to create copyrightable expression because it was "entirely typical" or
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test: if the work is "obvious" or "entirely typical" then it is not creative. 83
Alternatively, any work that is not "entirely typical" is creative and, there-
fore, may be sufficiently original to invoke copyright protection. 84 Typi-
cally, courts use this standard to judge whether a compilation is sufficiently
original to deserve copyright protection. 85
The second line of authority is most often applied to cases dealing
with creativity in derivative works.8 6 This second line of authority has be-
come known as the distinguishable variation standard. 87 The leading case
advocating the distinguishable variation standard is Alfred Bell & Co. v.
that it was a "garden-variety white pages directory, devoid of even the slightest trace
of creativity." Feist, 499 U.S. at 362. One commentator has noted that:
From this explanation, one can only assume that the Court would hold
that certain works or products are noncreative. For example, things that
can be characterized as "mechanical," "entirely typical," "garden-variety,"
"obvious," "basic information," "mere selection," "an age-old practice,
firmly rooted in tradition," "so commonplace that it has come to be ex-
pected as a matter of course," "practically inevitable," or a "time-honored
tradition" apparently lack Feist's "de minimus quantum of creativity."
VerSteeg, supra note 77, at 823 (quoting Feist, 499 U.S. at 362-63).
83. See Kregos, 937 F.2d at 705 (stating that question of whether work is suffi-
ciently creative depends on whether it is "entirely typical," "garden-variety," or "ob-
vious"). In Kregos, the plaintiff created a form containing information about
baseball pitchers. See id. at 702. The plaintiff's form, which was copyrighted, was
distributed to subscribing newspapers and included various statistics. See id. The
Associated Press began publishing a form that was virtually identical to the plain-
tiff's. See id. The issue in the case involved the plaintiff's right to "the form without
each day's data, in other words, his rights to the particular selection of categories
of statistics appearing on his form." Id.
The Second Circuit reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for
the defendant. See id. at 711. In doing so, the court "adopt[ed] a test for future
cases by posing the question, whether the previously published selections of statis-
tics had reached the point where it could be said the Kregos' selection was insuffi-
ciently creative or in the words of Feist, 'entirely typical,' 'garden variety,' or
'obvious."' Abrams, supra note 59, at 23. This standard conforms to the "minimal
degree of creativity" standard established by Feist. See id. at 24 (discussing Kregos
court's test in light of standard established by Feist). In effect, Kregos is an elabora-
tion of the limited standard of Feist. See id. By using the terms supplied by the Feist
Court, the Second Circuit suggested that any work that exceeded the minimum
standard is sufficiently creative to support a copyright. See id.
84. See Abrams, supra note 59, at 24 ("In sum, while Feist tells us the negative,
that a work failing to exceed these minima is not copyrightable, Kregos provides the
positive, that any work exceeding the minima is sufficiently creative to be
copyrightable.").
85. See, e.g., Kregos, 937 F.2d at 704-06 (dealing with originality required for
compilation to be copyrightable); Victor Lalli, 936 F.2d at 673 (same).
86. See, e.g., L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976)
(discussing level of creativity needed for derivative work to be copyrightable); Al-
fred Bell & Co., Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-103 (2d Cir. 1951)
(same).
87. See VerSteeg, supra note 77, at 818 (discussing different lines of authority
concerning creativity); see generally NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 52, § 2.01 [B], at
2-13 (asserting that any "distinguishable variation" of prior work constitutes
originality).
[Vol. 43: p. 873
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Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.88 According to the Alfred Bell court, a work is consid-
ered original if the author contributed something more than a "'merely
trivial' variation, something recognizably 'his [or her] own."' 89 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refined this stan-
dard in L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder.90 In L. Batlin, the court held that
copyright only protects work that is a "substantial variation" from the un-
derlying work.9 1 Further, the court added that originality can not be satis-
88. 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951). Although Alfred Bell is frequently cited as es-
pousing the distinguishable variation standard, the doctrine in many respects owes
its origin to the reasoning developed by Justice Holmes. See Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (declaring that ordinary posters or
advertisements are just as worthy of copyright protection as books and fine paint-
ings). In Bleistein, Justice Holmes stated that "[i] t would be a dangerous undertak-
ing for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the
worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits."
Id. This statement gave rise to the doctrine that 'Judges may not properly assay
artistic merit." NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 52, § 2.01 [B], at 2-13. Alfred Bell
built on this reasoning, concluding that "[nlo matter how poor artistically the 'au-
thor's' addition, it is enough if it be his own." Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 103 (citing
Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250). As long as the author contributed something more than
a "merely trivial" variation, the work should be considered original because it is not
ajudge's place to gauge the artistic merit of an author's work. See id. at 102-03 ("All
that is needed to satisfy ... the Constitution . . . is that the author contributed
something more than a 'merely trivial' variation, something recognizably 'his [or
her] own.'") (citations omitted).
89. Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 103.
90. 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976). L. Batlin & Son, Inc. sued to compel Snyder
to cancel the recordation of a copyright and to restrain Snyder from enforcing the
copyright. See id. at 487. The court had to decide whether Snyder's Uncle Sam
mechanical bank was copyrightable. See id. at 488. Snyder's bank was a derivative
work based on the original Uncle Sam mechanical bank. See id. The original
bank, copyrighted in 1886, was metal and stood 11 inches tall. See id. By the time
Snyder created its version of the bank, which was basically the same as the original
except that it was two inches shorter and made of plastic, the design of the bank
had long been part of the public domain and Snyder did not need permission to
copy its design. See id. Snyder filed a copyright with the Register of Copyrights in
January 1975. See id.
As early as August 1974, Batlin had ordered 30 cartons of a cast iron version of
the Uncle Sam bank, as well as a number of the plastic version, from a company in
Taiwan where the bank was manufactured. See id. In April 1975, the United
State's Customs Service notified Batlin that the plastic banks were covered by Sny-
der's copyright. See id. Batlin then brought the suit seeking to have Snyder's copy-
fight declared void. See id. The district court granted Batlin a preliminary
injunction and Snyder appealed. See id. The Second Circuit had to decide
whether the district court abused its discretion in granting the injunction. See id.
91. See id. at 491 ("We do follow the school of cases in this circuit and else-
where supporting the proposition that to support a copyright there must be at
least some substantial variation, not merely a trivial variation such as might occur
in the translation to a different medium."); see also Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698
F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1983) (relying on L. Batlin in adopting "substantially differ-
ent" standard of creativity and holding that "a derivative work must be substantially
different from the underlying work to be copyrightable").
In applying the refined test to the facts in L. Batlin, the Second Circuit found
that Snyder's bank was not original and therefore was not copyrightable. Cf L.
Batlin, 536 F.2d at 492. The court specifically stated that simply changing the me-
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fled simply by the demonstration of "physical skill" or "special training. '9 2
Despite the added restrictions, the court continued to abide by the belief
that "[t]he test of originality is concededly one with a low threshold."9 3
When applying the distinguishable variation standard, courts have fo-
cused on the nature of the changes, not the number of them.9 4 Courts
have also refused to extend copyright protection to a derivative work
where the changes to the preexisting work were "driven primarily by a
functional, utilitarian or mechanical purpose."95 Finally, courts have fur-
dium, i.e., changing the bank from metal to plastic, was "merely a trivial variation."
See id. at 491. ("'[T]he mere reproduction of a work of art in a different medium
should not constitute the required originality ....' (quoting NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 52, § 20.2, at 94)). The court reasoned that extending copyright pro-
tection to merely trivial or "minuscule variations would simply put a weapon for
harassment in the hands of mischievous copiers intent on appropriating and
monopolizing public domain work." See id. at 492.
The rationale for the change was further explained by the Seventh Circuit in
Gracen. See Gracen, 698 F.2d at 305. The court stated its belief that the liberal rule,
trivial variation, had the effect of inhibiting the creation of further works by "giving
the first creator a considerable power to interfere with the creation of subsequent
... works from the same underlying work." Id. But see NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 52, § 3.03, at 3-16 (questioning Gracen court's reasoning by asking, "why
should this be the case, as long as it is open to a second derivative work creator to
base his work only upon the underlying work, and not upon the first derivative
work").
92. See L. Batlin, 536 F.2d at 491 (rejecting notion that demonstration of phys-
ical skill or special training alone is enough to meet originality requirement). The
court stated that even if making the plastic molds that created Snyder's bank re-
quired "special training" or "physical skills," that skill or training alone was not
enough to make the bank original. See id. "A considerably higher degree of skill is
required, true artistic skill, to make the reproduction copyrightable." Id. The
court looked at the specifics of the case and noted that the plastic molds took
about a day and a half to two days to create. See id. The court noted that "[i]f
there be a point in the copyright law pertaining to reproductions at which sheer
artistic skill and effort can act as a substitute for the requirement of substantial
variation, it was not reached here." Id.
93. Id. at 490.
94. See, e.g., Grove Press, Inc. v. Collectors Publications, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 603,
605 (C.D. Cal. 1967) (finding that 40,000 trivial changes did not amount to origi-
nality). In Grove Press, the court stated that:
Plaintiff made approximately forty thousand changes from the [original]
copy in producing its edition. These changes consisted almost entirely of
elimination and addition of punctuation, changes of spelling of certain
words, elimination and addition of quotation marks, and correction of
typographical errors. These changes required no skill beyond that of a
high school English student and displayed no originality. These changes
are found to be trivial.
Id. at 605. Because each of the plaintiff's changes were trivial, the work was un-
copyrightable even though the plaintiff made 40,000 such changes. See id. at 606
("Since the new matter in the Grove edition was trivial, the Grove edition is un-
copyrightable as a derivative work or otherwise.").
95. Entertainment Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis Creative Group, Inc., 853
F. Supp. 319, 322 (N.D. Cal. 1994). Entertainment Research Group (ERG)
claimed a copyright in three-dimensional inflatable costumes that it manufactured
of characters such as "Toucan Sam" and "Geoffrey the Giraffe." See id. at 320-21.
[Vol. 43: p. 873
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ther refined the distinguishable variation standard by ruling that changes
to a preexisting work that are imperceptible to the reader do not merit
copyright protection.
9 6
2. West's Victories: Mead and Oasis
West previously won two important cases involving star pagination,
the first of which was its victory over its rival LEXIS, in West Publishing Co. v.
Mead Data Central, Inc.97 In Mead, West brought a copyright infringement
action based on Mead's proposed use of star pagination to West's report-
The defendant sought summaryjudgment, claiming that ERG's copyright was inva-
lid. See id. at 321. ERG claimed that the costumes they manufactured were copy-
rightable derivative works "which are based on previously copyrighted characters
(i.e., ERG is claiming a derivative copyright in their inflatable Doughboy, where
Pillsbury obviously owns the underlying copyright for the Doughboy)." Id.
In deciding whether ERG's costumes were sufficiently original to warrant
copyright protection as a derivative work, the court basically followed the L. Batlin
substantial variation test. See id. at 321-22 (discussing and applying substantial vari-
ation test). Also, the court added that "[a]ny differences in appearance between a
derivative work and the preexisting work which are driven primarily by a func-
tional, utilitarian or mechanical purpose cannot be considered when seeking artis-
tic differences for the purpose of originality." Id. at 322-23.
The court examined, as one example, the "Toucan Sam" costume. See id. at
323 (applying substantial variation test and excluding any changes that were
"driven primarily by function"). The court recognized that there were differences
between the preexisting work and the derivative costume. See id. For example, the
original "Toucan Sam" had short, skinny legs that were drawn far apart on the
torso. See id. The costume version, however, had thick, bulky legs that were placed
close to the torso. See id. The court noted that these were not artistic or original
changes that ERG decided to make. See id. Rather, the changes in appearance of
the costumes were due to the limitations of the human body, i.e., functional,
mechanical and utilitarian considerations. See id. Therefore the court concluded
that "[n]o reasonable trier-of-fact could find that [the] differences were the result
of 'artistic' decision making" and granted summary judgment to the defendant.
Id. at 323-24.
96. See EFS Mktg., Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., Inc., 836 F. Supp. 128, 133
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("Minuscule variations of otherwise preexisting craftsmanship that
are imperceptible to the reader are insufficient to obtain copyright protection.") (em-
phasis added) (citing L. Batlin, 536 F.2d at 489). In L. Batlin, the fact that the
Snyder's changes to the bank were imperceptible to a casual observer was clearly
part of the court's reasoning in concluding that Snyder's derivative work was not a
substantial variation of the original bank. See L. Batlin, 536 F.2d at 489. The court
stated:
Appellant Snyder claims differences not only of size but also in a number
of other very minute details: the carpetbag shape of the plastic bank is
smooth, the iron bank rough; the metal bank bag is fatter at its base; the
eagle on the front of the platform in the metal bank is holding arrows in
his talons while in the plastic bank he clutches leaves .... In the metal
version the umbrella is hanging loose while in the plastic item it is in-
cluded in a single mold .... Many of these differences are not percepti-
ble to the casual observer. Appellants make no claim for any difference
based on the plastic mold lines in the Uncle Sam figure which are
perceptible.
Id.
97. 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986).
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ers in its computer-assisted legal research system, LEXIS.98 The United
States District Court for the District of Minnesota decided the issue in
West's favor and granted a preliminary injunction against Mead.9 9 On ap-
peal, the Unites States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision. 10 0
First, the Eighth Circuit held that arrangement and pagination could
be protected by copyright. 10 1 After examining what it considered to be
the most relevant precedents, 10 2 the court concluded that "[a]n arrange-
ment of opinions in a case reporter, no less than a compilation and ar-
98. See id. at 1221 (discussing facts in appeal from preliminary injunction).
LEXIS is a computer-assisted legal research service, first marketed in 1973, which
reports decisions of state and federal courts. See id. at 1222. Cases stored on
LEXIS had always included the citation to the first page of West's reported deci-
sion. See id. West never challenged the use of page numbers, acknowledging that
citation to the first page was a noninfringing "fair use" under the 1976 Act. See id.
In 1985, however, LEXIS announced a plan to provide its users with a star
pagination feature that would insert page numbers from West's National Reporter
System into the body of LEXIS cases. See id. (discussing how system would provide
'Jump" or "pinpoint" citations to West's reporters). "Thus, with the LEXIS Star
Pagination Feature, LEXIS users would be able to determine the West page
number corresponding to the portion of an opinion viewed on LEXIS without ever
physically referring to the West publication in which the opinion appears." Id.
West then filed suit, arguing that "the LEXIS Star Pagination Feature [was] an
appropriation of [its] comprehensive arrangement of case reports in violation of
the Copyright Act of 1976." Id. This is the same issue that the court faced in
Bender. See generally Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (analyzing issue of copyright protection for West's reporters).
99. See West Publ'g Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1571, 1583 (D.
Minn. 1985) (relying in part on the Supreme Court's decision in Callaghan). The
court interpreted Callaghan to stand for the proposition that "under appropriate
circumstances pagination and arrangement ascend to a level appropriate for copy-
right protection." Id. at 1576 (citing Callaghan v. Meyers, 128 U.S. 617, 661, 662
(1888)). The court thought copyright protection would be appropriate where the
arrangement and page numbers were the result of the "labor, talent, or judgment"
of the creator. See id. On the other hand, if the arrangement and page numbers
"depend simply on the will of the printer, or the order in which the cases have
been decided, or upon other accidental circumstances, they of course are not sub-
ject to copyright protection .... " Id. In applying this principle to the facts, the
court determined that West's arrangement satisfied the Callaghan test and there-
fore could be protected by copyright. See id. For a further discussion of the
Supreme Court's decision in Callaghan, see infra notes 104-06 and accompanying
text.
100. See Mead, 799 F.2d at 1229-30 (concluding that district court did not
abuse its discretion in granting preliminary injunction). For a discussion of the
Eighth Circuit's reasoning and analysis, see infra notes 101-10 and accompanying
text.
101. See Mead, 799 F.2d at 1223-26 (discussing potential copyright protection
for arrangement and pagination).
102. See generally id. (discussing relevant authority, focusing on Callaghan).
The court's choice of relevant authority has been the subject of much criticism. See
e.g., Carl J. Khalil, Are Page Numbers Really Copyrightable? The Effect of Feist on the West
Publishing v. Lexis Case, 76J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 807, 811 (1994) (stating
that court relied on "perhaps the most specious of authority"); Wyman, supra note
5, at 244-45 (questioning Mead court's reliance on Callaghan); see also Dahl, supra
[Vol. 43: p. 873
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rangement of Shakespeare's sonnets, can qualify for copyright
protection."1 0 3  In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on the
Supreme Court's decision in Callaghan v. Meyers.1 04 In Callaghan, the
note 68, at 733 (same). For a further discussion of the Mead court's questionable
use of precedent, see infra notes 104-05.
103. Mead, 799 F.2d at 1224. In making this conclusion, the court specifically
rejected Mead's contention that case arrangements were per se uncopyrightable.
See id. at 1223 (summarizing Mead's argument). Mead claimed that the portion of
West's cases that were actually used by LEXIS, specifically the page numbers, were
not copyrightable. See id. To support this claim, Mead argued that an arrange-
ment of cases and page numbers could not possibly meet the original work of
authorship requirement. See id. In the alternative, Mead argued that even if ar-
rangement and pagination could possibly qualify as an original work, "West's case
arrangement and pagination do not in fact meet this standard." Id.
The court stated that the "dominant chord" of Mead's argument was that
mere page numbers are not copyrightable. See id. According to the court, Mead
would have prevailed if it were indeed just mere page numbers that West sought to
copyright. See id. at 1227. The court concluded that West sought copyright protec-
tion "because access to these particular numbers-the 'jump cites'-would give
users of LEXIS a large part of what West has spent so much labor and industry in
compiling, and would pro tanto reduce anyone's need to buy West's books." Id.
The court, however, reasoned that Mead was not just copying page numbers.
See id. at 1224. The page numbers reflected and expressed the arrangement of a
compilation, and the arrangement of a compilation was copyrightable. See id.
Therefore if West's arrangement of cases qualified as an original work of author-
ship, use of West's page numbers would infringe West's copyright. Cf id.
104. 128 U.S. 617 (1888). The fact that the Mead court relied so heavily on
Callaghan has led some courts and commentators to question the court's decision.
See, e.g., Mead, 799 F.2d at 1238-39 (Oliver, J., dissenting) (suggesting that court's
reliance on Callaghan is misplaced); Wyman, supra note 5, at 244-45 (questioning
Mead court's reliance on Callaghan); see also Dahl, supra note 68, at 733 (same). In
Callaghan, the defendant copied the plaintiff's arrangement of cases as well as the
plaintiffs headnotes, statements of cases and arguments of counsel. See Callaghan,
128 U.S. at 619-33 (stating case for copyright infringement); see also Dahl, supra
note 68, at 733 (discussing facts of Callaghan); Patterson &Joyce, supra note 24, at
744 (stating that issue in Callaghan involved both judicial opinions and original
matter).
It is arguable that the more sound decision would have been to rely on Banks
v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888), because the facts of that case more closely re-
sembled the facts of Mead. See Mead, 799 F.2d at 1243 (J. Oliver, dissenting) ("The
record in this case establishes a factual situation comparable to Banks v. Manchester
rather than that presented in Callaghan."); see also Dahl, supra note 68, at 733 (com-
paring Banks to Mead and determining that Banks is factually similar to Mead).
Despite the factual similarities, the majority in Mead did not even cite or discuss
the Banks decision. See Mead, 799 F.2d at 123940 (J. Oliver, dissenting) (finding
fault with majority opinior). In Banks, the Court held that judges were not enti-
tled to copyright protection for the opinions they authored while acting in their
official capacities. See Banks, 128 U.S. at 253. The Court also ruled that a reporter
of opinions could not copyright judicial opinions because the reporter did not
create them. See id. at 250-51. Banks is significant in relation to Mead because
Banks led one court that closely examined the decision to conclude that "the re-
porter's right to protection must be limited to his [or her] intellectual labor."
Banks Law Publ'g Co. v. Lawyers' Co-operative Publ'g Co., 169 F. 386, 390 (2d Cir.
1909).
In Banks, the defendant only reproduced the unprotected works of judges; in
Callaghan, however, copyrightable elements of the reporter were also appropri-
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Court indirectly addressed the copyrightability of arrangement and pagi-
nation of case reporters. 10 5 The Callaghan Court stated, in dicta, that case
arrangement and pagination were features of a case reporter that may be
protected by copyright. 10 6 Thus,. the Mead court concluded that the
ated. See Mead, 799 F.2d at 1243 (J. Oliver, dissenting). In Mead, as in Banks, the
defendant did not use any of West's original material, such as headnotes, syllabi,
indexes or tables of cases that would be protected by copyright. See id. at 1223.
Therefore it is arguable that the court in Mead should have "follow[ed] Banks v.
Manchesters application of the principles enunciated in Wheaton v. Peters and distin-
guished Callaghan on its facts." Id. at 1243 (J. Oliver, dissenting).
The Mead court has also been criticized for not applying Lawyers' Co-operative.
See id. at 1245 (J. Oliver, dissenting) (dissenting from majority's rejection of Law-
yers' Co-operative); see also Dahl, supra note 68, at 733-34 (arguing that majority's
emphasis on official status of reporter in Lawyers' Co-operative was misplaced). The
majority stated that the ruling in Lawyers' Co-operative was "based upon the official
status of the reporter." See Mead, 799 F.2d at 1225. The court also stressed its
belief that Lawyers' Co-operative conflicted with Callaghan and as a decision of the
Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit had no choice but to follow Callaghan. See id. at
1226 ("To the extent that [Lawyers' Co-operative] diverges from Callaghan, we of
course follow the Supreme Court.").
As stated above, it can be argued that the majority opinion in Mead "placed
too much emphasis on the official status of the reporter in [Lawyers' Co-operative]."
Dahl, supra note 68, at 733-34. Instead, Lawyers' Co-operative should be viewed in
conjunction with Eggers v. Sun Sales, 263 F. 373 (2d Cir. 1920), "which held pagina-
tion ... [was] not independently copyrightable when the report was not made
pursuant to a specific statutory requirement." Dahl, supra note 68, at 734 (citing
Eggers, 263 F. at 375). In addition, the Mead court incorrectly categorized Lawyers'
Co-operative as conflicting with Callaghan. Cf Patterson & Joyce, supra note 24, at
745 ("Lawyers Co-operative is consistent with Wheaton and [Banks], and not inconsis-
tent with Callaghan."). Specifically, Callaghan dealt with a situation involving
"piracy of law books" and the use of star pagination by legal publishers is not
piracy. See id.
105. See Dahl, supra note 68, at 727 (stating that Court in Callaghan indirectly
dealt with issues of arrangement and pagination). In Callaghan, the defendant was
a publisher who wanted to publish judicial opinions and negotiated with the plain-
tiff for the use of his reports. See Callaghan, 128 U.S. at 619-22. After his attempts
to obtain the plaintiff's rights to the work failed, the defendant copied the reports,
including the arrangement and page numbers, without the plaintiff's permission.
See id. The Court ruled that the defendant's action constituted infringement of
the plaintiff's copyright. See id. at 662. Despite noting that arrangement and pagi-
nation were elements of a reporter that may be protected by copyright, the Court
expressly refused to recognize the plaintiffs copyright in those elements. See id.
("[T] he arrangement of law cases and the paging of the book may depend simply
on the will of the printer, of the reporter, or publisher, or order in which the cases
have been decided, or upon other accidental circumstances."); see also Dahl, supra
note 68, at 728 (offering analysis of Court's holding in Callaghan and stating that
"the Supreme Court made it clear that Callaghan's works would not have consti-
tuted an infringement had he not pirated other, original portions of Myer's re-
porter, namely his headnotes, tables, indexes, and syllabi.").
106. See Callaghan, 128 U.S. at 649; see also Dahl, supra note 68, at 728 (ex-
plaining Court's statement that pagination and arrangement could potentially be
protected by copyright under certain circumstances).
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Supreme Court's dicta indicated that there was not a per se rule against
copyright protection for case arrangements and pagination.
10 7
Second, the Mead court concluded that "the arrangement West pro-
duces . . . is the result of considerable labor, talent, and judgment."' 0 8
The court stated that originality required only a modicum of intellectual
labor and West's reporters easily met that standard.10 9 Therefore, West's
case arrangements, including internal pagination, were original works of
authorship entitled to copyright protection. 110
Because the Mead court relied so heavily on the labor West exerted in
arranging its cases,1 11 some commentators have questioned the validity of
107. See Mead, 799 F.2d at 1226 (finding that "there is no per se rule that case
arrangements are not copyrightable"). The court stated that "Callaghan does not
seem so hostile to the very idea that case compilation, arrangement, and paging
can be protected by copyright." Id. But see Dahl, supra note 68, at 728 (arguing
that Callaghan Court expressly refused to recognize copyright in case arrangement
and page numbers).
108. Mead, 799 F.2d at 1226. In order to support the conclusion that West
exerted considerable effort in arranging its cases, the court explained West's pub-
lishing process. See id. (describing West's arrangement of opinions). First, West
collects the opinions from every federal and state court in the United States. See id.
The federal and state opinions are divided and then assigned to the appropriate
reporter series. See id. West further divides state court opinions by geographic
region and those decisions are then assigned to the appropriate regional reporter.
See id. Federal opinions are first divided according to the level of the court by
which they were decided. See id. Those opinions may be further divided according
to the subject matter of the case. See id. Once a decision has been assigned to a
reporter, it will then be assigned to a volume and arranged within that volume. See
id. For example, federal court of appeals decisions are arranged by circuit within
each volume of West's Federal Reporter, Second Series. See id.
109. See id. at 1227 ("[T]o meet ... [the originality] requirement[ ] a work
need only be the product of a modicum of intellectual labor; West's case arrange-
ments easily meet this standard.") The court further justified its conclusion by
explaining that a contrary holding would allow Mead to use star pagination,
thereby giving LEXIS users "a large part of what West has spent so much labor and
industry in compiling." Id.
110. See id. (holding that West's arrangements are original works of author-
ship and that Mead's proposed use of star pagination would infringe West's copy-
right in those arrangements).
111. See Wyman, supra note 5, at 241 (stating that Mead court "focused an
inordinate amount of attention on the labor West expended in compiling its case
reporters"); see also Khalil, supra note 102, at 811 (commenting that court relied in
substantial part on fact that West expended considerable labor and effort in pre-
paring its case reports). "West's arrangement, the court observed, was 'the result
of considerable labor, talent and judgment'; and what [Mead] was trying to do was
give its users 'a large part of what West has spent so much labor and industry in
compiling."' Wyman, supra note 5, at 241. The court also applied the "sweat of
the brow" theory when applying what it considered to be relevant precedent. See
generally Mead, 799 F.2d at 1224 (discussing Court's decision in Callaghan and con-
sidering labor involved in arrangement and pagination in that case). For example,
the court concluded that the reason that the Callaghan Court had not specifically
ruled that case arrangement and pagination were independently copyrightable was
that the arrangement and pagination in question "involved little labor." See id.
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Mead in light of Feist.' 12 Despite these questions, the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota affirmed the Mead decision in Oasis
Publishing Co., Inc. v. West Publishing Co. 13
Oasis Publishing Company, Inc. ("Oasis") published cases and stat-
utes in Compact Disk-Read Only Memory ("CD-ROM") format.1 14 Oasis
intended to publish Florida court decisions on CD-ROM with both parallel
citation and star pagination to West's Florida Cases.1 15 Oasis sued West,
112. See, e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 52, § 3.03, at 3-15 ("It is doubtful
[that Mead] ... survives the Supreme Court's rejection of the 'sweat of the brow'
doctrine [in Feist].") (footnote omitted); Khalil, supra note 102, at 811 (concluding
that Feist undermines court's holding in Mead). Considering the holding of Feist, it
is obvious why Mead is now questionable authority. See id. at 810. The district
court, for example, referred to West's "effort" and "enterprise" at least once each
and to the "labor" that West exerted at least four times. See id. at 811. After Feist,
however, considerations of labor and enterprise are no longer relevant. See id.
(discussing how Feist undermined previous considerations, including labor and en-
terprise, in copyright cases involving West); see also Wyman, supra note 5, at 242
("[T] he amount of labor expended ... is, after Feist, entirely irrelevant to copy-
right considerations.").
Similarly, the position of the Eighth Circuit, in Mead, is severely weakened by
Feist. See Khalil, supra note 102, at 811. "The Eighth Circuit relied upon ... per-
haps the most specious authority... and.., the considerable labor expenditure of
West Publishing. Feist undermined each of these bases for the Eighth Circuit
holding." Id. (citations omitted).
113. 924 F. Supp. 918 (D. Minn. 1996). The court declared that "Feist did not
overrule Mead." Id. at 923. According to the Oasis court, Mead applied essentially
the same standard of creativity that was used in Feist. See id. Mead had not applied
a mere "sweat of the brow" analysis, rather it considered the "'originality and intel-
lectual-creation requirements' of the arrangement." Id. (quoting Mead, 799 F.2d at
1225-26). In its analysis, the court emphasized that Feist had not created a new test
of originality; Feist simply "reaffirmed the originality standard as it existed in the
Copyright Act of 1909, as it was consistently recognized by the Copyright Office,
and as it was emphasized by the Copyright Act of 1976." Id. The court also stated
that even if Feist had created a new test, West's arrangement would easily satisfy the
"modicum of creativity" standard articulated in Feist. See id. at 924. For these rea-
sons, the Oasis court concluded that Mead was still applicable to the facts before it,
even in light of Feist. See id. at 923-24 (applying Mead analysis to facts of case).
114. See id. at 920. Oasis planned to obtain a copy of West's Florida Cases,
which contains all of the Florida cases that West prints in its Southern Reporter, and
reproduce it in CD-ROM format. See id. at 921. The CD-ROM product would con-
tain both parallel citation and star pagination to lorida Cases. See id. West was
willing to concede that the inclusion of parallel citation was a "fair use" under the
Copyright Act. See id. As in Mead, however, West contended that the use of star
pagination violated its copyright. See id.
115. See id. (explaining Oasis's plans with regard to its CD-ROM product).
Oasis did not plan to use any material authored by West, such as case synopses,
syllabi, etc. See id. West publishes Florida Cases, in which it reprints Florida cases
that appear in West's Southern Reporter. See id. (explaining West's publishing activi-
ties in Florida). Florida Cases is the official reporter of the state of Florida. See id. at
921. Since 1957, West's contract with Florida contained a clause that stated "' [t]he
Synopsis, Syllabi, and Key Number Digest classifications, Index Digest, Table of
Statutes Construed ...included in the volumes of Florida Cases, are subject to
copyright and will be copyrighted. Beginning in 1987, the parties added 'and ar-
rangement of cases' to the sentence." Id.
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seeking a declaratory judgment that its actions did not violate West's copy-
right.1 16 The court, relying on Mead, determined that West's arrangement
of cases possessed "the requisite creativity for copyright protection."]17 Fi-
nally, the court held that pagination was an integral part of arrangement
and was protected by West's copyright.118
III. MATrHEW BENDER & CO. V. WEST PUBLISHING Co.: FACTS AND
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. West Publishing Company
West is the leading publisher of state and federal judicial opinions in
the United States. 119 West compiles these decisions in books known as
116. See id. (explaining Oasis's claims as alleged in its complaint). In addi-
tion, Oasis claimed that West had created and maintained an illegal monopoly and
a dangerous probability of monopoly under both federal and Florida law. See id.
Also, Oasis claimed that West's refusal to allow it to star paginate violated a
number of Florida public records statutes. See id.
117. Id. at 925. The court concluded that the Eighth Circuit, in Mead, applied
the proper originality standard and that West's arrangement of cases "easily satis-
fied the 'modicum of creativity' standard later emphasized repeatedly by the
Supreme Court in Feist." Id. at 924.
118. See id. at 925 ("Pagination of that arrangement is an integral part of the
arrangement and shares in any copyright protection in the arrangement itself.").
Oasis appealed the decision and West, despite its victory, offered Oasis a favorable
settlement to withdraw its appeal. See Thomas Scheffey, A Cagey Move?, CONN. L.
TRIB., Aug. 11, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Clt File (discussing West's
settlement with Oasis). The exact terms of the settlement were not revealed, but
West stated that "it paid some of Oasis' legal costs, gave the small CD-ROM pub-
lisher a 'not insignificant' money settlement and entered into a licensing deal per-
mitting Oasis to use West's book and page numbers at a favorable rate." Id. By
settling the case, West preserved the favorable decisions of Mead and Oasis and
reduced the prospects of settlement of the star pagination issue by the Supreme
Court. See id. (discussing legal implications of Oasis settlement).
119. See Patterson & Joyce, supra note 24, at 720-21 n.2 (stating that West is
"premier publisher of state and federal judicial opinions"). West has been in legal
publishing since 1876. See id. (discussing activities of John B. West, founder of
West Publishing and his first publication, The Syllabi). In 1975, West started
WESTLAW, its computer-assisted legal research system. See id.
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"reporters."120 Citing to West's reporters is a commonly accepted and
often necessary practice in many legal documents.12 '
Before an opinion is included in a reporter, West proofreads it and
checks the citations, often adding parallel citations when it believes one is
necessary. 122 West then prepares headnotes, adds a synopsis of the opin-
ion to the case and arranges the opinion to conform with its style and
format.1 2 3 Next, West assigns the opinion, according to the subject matter
or the particular court, to one of the individual series in the National Re-
porter System. 124 Each reported opinion is assigned to a volume and fur-
ther categorized and arranged within that volume. 125 Finally, volume and
page numbers are added, allowing for precise reference to the location of
120. See Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., No. 94 CIV. 0568, 1995
WL 702389, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 1995). Each reporter is part of a series of
books known as the "National Reporter System." See West Publ'g Co. v. Mead Data
Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1221 (8th Cir. 1986) (describing West's publishing sys-
tem). The "National Reporter System" consists of 15 trademarks: Atlantic Re-
porter, Bankruptcy Reporter, California Reporter, Federal Reporter, Federal Rules
Decisions, Federal Supplement, Military Justice Reporter, New York Supplement,
North Eastern Reporter, Southern Reporter, South Western Reporter and
Supreme Court Reporter. See Patterson & Joyce, supra note 24, at 721-22 n.5.
West also publishes official reports that are not considered units of the Na-
tional Reporter System: Arizona Reports, Idaho Reports, Maryland Reports, Mary-
land Appellate Reports, New Jersey Reports, New Jersey Superior Court Reports,
New Jersey Tax Court Reports, New Mexico Reports, Pennsylvania Reports and
Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports. See id. at 727-28 n.21.
Some state reporters have been discontinued and the volumes of the National
Reporter System are now designated as official: Alabama Reports, Alabama Appel-
late Court Reports, Delaware Reports, Delaware Chancery Reports, Colorado Re-
ports, Florida Reports, Iowa Reports, Indiana Reports, Indiana Court of Appeals
Reports, Kentucky Reports, Maine Reports, Minnesota Reports, Mississippi Re-
ports, Missouri Reports, North Dakota Reports, Oklahoma Reports, Oklahoma
Criminal Reports, South Dakota Reports, Tennessee Reports, Tennessee Criminal
Appeals Reports, Wisconsin Reports and Wyoming Reports. See id.
Several other states have discontinued their own reports, but have not desig-
nated West's volumes as official: Louisiana Reports, Texas Reports, Texas Criminal
Appellate Reports, Texas Civil Appellate Reports and Utah Reports. See id.
121. See Patterson &Joyce, supra note 24, at 727-28 n.21 ("Citation to the spe-
cific volume and page number of a case as found in a West reporter is common,
and indeed often necessary, in judicial opinions, attorney's briefs and other legal
documents."); see also D.C. CIR. R. 8(f) (requiring use of Federal Reporter for Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit Court decisions and National Reporter System for state
court decisions); IST CIR. R. 11(h) (requiring use of West's system for state deci-
sions); 3D CIR. R. 21 (1) (A) (i) (calling for use of West system "whenever possible");
Berring, supra note 5, at 631 n.61 (stating that 15 federal district and circuit courts
require citation to West publications).
122. See Mead, 799 F.2d at 1221-22 (describing West's procedure before cases
are published).
123. See id. at 1222 (documenting additions West makes to cases).
124. See id. (including such reporters as Federal Reporter, Second Series or Bank-
ruptcy Reporter).
125. See id. (detailing West's process).
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the case within West's system. 126 When each volume is completed, West
registers a copyright claim with the Register of Copyrights and receives a
Certificate of Registration for the volume.
127
B. Matthew Bender & Company
Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. ("Bender") is a legal publisher
whose works include a number of casebooks, treatises and practice
guides.128 Bender also produces products in CD-ROM format.1 29 In its
CD-ROM products, Bender inserts into the text of the opinions the vol-
ume and page number where the text of the opinion is found in West's
reporter.130 Bender provides the users of the CD-ROM product with the
volume and page number where a case begins and the place in the text
where the page break occurs in West's version of the opinion. 131 In effect,
Bender star-paginates to West's reporters. 132 By doing so, Bender allows
its CD-ROM users to cite to West volumes without having to purchase
West's products. 133
C. HyperLaw, Inc.
HyperLaw, Inc. ("HyperLaw") is a CD-ROM publisher that specializes
in the publication of legal information. 134 One of HyperLaw's products is
126. See id. ("Volumes and pages are numbered sequentially to facilitate pre-
cise reference to West reports; citing the proper volume number, series name, and
page number communicates the exact location of a West report, or a portion
thereof, within the National Reporter System.").
127. See id. (discussing West's final step in certification).
128. See Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., No. 94 CIV. 0589, 1995
WL 702389, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 1995).
129. See id. (explaining portion of Bender's business). One such product is a
comprehensive collection of published and unpublished decisions, beginning with
cases from 1990, of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and the four United
States District Courts within New York called the "Search Master New York Practice
Library With Cases" ("Search Master"). See id. Bender also planned future ver-
sions of Search Master that were to contain federal and state cases from earlier
years. See id.
130. See Memorandum of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of
the Proposition that Bender's Star Pagination to West's National Reporter System
Does Not Infringe Any Copyright Interest West May Have In the Arrangement of
the National Reporter System at 3-4, Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co.,
No. 94 CIV. 0589, 1997 WL 266972 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1997) available at <http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f0800/0866.htm>.
131. See id.
132. See id. (explaining star pagination). In legal publishing, the procedure
of inserting the page number of one publication into the text of another, for pur-
pose of cross-referencing, is known as "star paging." See Matthew Bender & Co. v.
West Publ'g Co., No. 94 CIV. 0589, 1996 WL 223917, at *3 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. May 2,
1996).
133. See Bender, 1995 WL 702389, at *1.
134. See Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment at 6, Bender, 1997 WL
266972, available at <http://www.hyperlaw.com/hlsjfin.htm> (explaining
HyperLaw's method of collecting and compiling cases).
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a CD-ROM database that contains all of the cases that HyperLaw has col-
lected from the United States Courts of Appeals and the Supreme
Court.135 While HyperLaw obtains most of its cases from other sources, it
did scan a number of cases directly from West's reporters.1 36 HyperLaw
planned to expand its product to provide a user with the ability to see the
text of any opinion cited in a case by simply clicking on the citation. 137
Because many of the cases cited date back to before HyperLaw began to
collect cases, HyperLaw planned to scan the older cases into its products
directly from West's reporters.138
D. The Case
In February 1994, Bender filed an action in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York seeking a declaration that
West did not possess a federal statutory copyright in the page numbers of
its reporters. 139 HyperLaw intervened as a plaintiff in the action. 140
HyperLaw sought a declaration of noninfringement with respect to page
numbers, as well as to its use of West's reporters in its CD-ROM
product. 141
135. See id. HyperLaw began collecting Supreme Court cases in 1991 and
started collecting cases from the Courts of Appeals in 1993. See id. ByJune 1996,
HyperLaw had collected 36,000 cases, of which 22,000 had also been published by
West in its reporters. See id.
136. See Bende; 1997 WL 266972, at *1 (revealing that HyperLaw scanned "a
small percentage of cases" from West's reporters). HyperLaw scanned the title,
text and other information directly from West's reporters. See id. HyperLaw, how-
ever, did not scan West's headnotes or key numbers. See id.
137. See id. (discussing HyperLaw's plans to expand its product).
138. See id. Ultimately, this practice may result in HyperLaw scanning up to
75% of West cases into its system. See id. In its motion for summary judgment,
HyperLaw supplied an example of what it intended to copy from one of West's
reporters. See Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment at 6, Bender, 1997 WL
266972, available at <http://www.hyperlaw.com/hlsjfin.htm> (describing
HyperLaw's intended use of West's work). Using Volume 1 of the Federal Re-
porter-Third Series as an example, HyperLaw cites 15 cases that it could not obtain
electronically and would have to scan into its system. See id. HyperLaw would have
to copy the names of counsel published by West from Fifth and Eleventh Circuit
cases and other circuits in which West is not the slip opinion reporter. See id. at 7.
Also, like Bender, HyperLaw plans to star-paginate to the West reporter. See id.
139. See Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., No. 94 CIV. 0589, 1996
WL 223917, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 1996). Bender also filed a declaratory action
concerning a similar product that it produced covering Texas law. See id. at *7
(discussing Bender's Texas product action). The Texas product is a CD-ROM enti-
tled "Search Master Texas Practice Library." See id. Bender hoped to enhance the
Search Master by adding published decisions of the Texas courts for the past 40
years. See id. (" [The enhancement would allow] users ... [to] move from a cita-
tion in a Bender treatise to the actual judicial opinion. The opinions in the Texas
product will contain star pagination to the Texas court opinions in West's South
Western Reporter.").
140. See id. at *1.
141. See id.
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After West's motion to dismiss the complaints was denied, Bender
and HyperLaw moved for summaryjudgment on their respective issues. 14 2
After hearing arguments from each side, the court granted both Bender's
and HyperLaw's motions for summary judgment on the star pagination
issue.1 43 The court, however, found that a disputed issue of material fact
existed with respect to HyperLaw's claims regarding the text of opinions
and accordingly denied HyperLaw's motion on those claims. 144 After a
trial on the remaining issues, the court found that HyperLaw's use, in its
CD-ROM product, of cases that it scanned directly from West's reporters
did not violate West's copyright.145
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publishing Co.: Narrative Analysis
In Bender, the court addressed two separate issues, each having a po-
tentially tremendous impact on the future of the legal publishing mar-
ket.146 After a hearing concerning the parties' motions for summary
judgment, the court granted judgment in favor of Bender and HyperLaw
on the star pagination issue.' 47 The court then ruled that HyperLaw
could scan cases from West's reporters directly into its computer system
without violating West's copyright. 14
8
1. Star Pagination
In its previous copyright battles, West successfully argued that a com-
petitor's "star pagination constitute[d] appropriation of West's compre-
142. See Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321, 1321
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
143. See Bender, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1330 (concluding that "summary judgment
should be issued on the question of the use of star pagination").
144. See id. (finding that "it is a more practical approach ... that the issues of
fact be developed at trial").
145. Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publishing Co., No. 94 CIV. 0589, 1997
WL 266972, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1997) ("HyperLaw is entitled to a judgment
that its copying on [sic] the opinions from the West reports does not violate West's
copyrights."). For an analysis of the court's holding in Bender, see infra notes 146-
254 and accompanying text.
146. For a discussion of the facts of Bender, see supra notes 119-46 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of the potential effects of the decision on the legal
publishing market and legal research, see infra notes 255-94 and accompanying
text.
147. See Bender, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1330 (holding page numbers of West's re-
porters were not protected by copyright). For a discussion of the court's reasoning
in ruling that West's page numbers were not protected by copyright, see infra notes
149-67 and accompanying text.
148. See Bender, 1997 WL 266972, at *4 (ruling that West did not have protect-
able interest in text of opinions it published). The court based its decision on
evidence presented in a very brief trial. See generally Transcript, Jan. 27-28, 1997
Trial, Bender, 1997 WL 266972, available at <http://www.hyperlaw.com/
trialtr.htm>.
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hensive arrangement of case reports in violation of the Copyright Revision
Act of 1976." 149 West took the same position in Bender, arguing that
although facts are not copyrightable, a compilation is protected by copy-
right. 150 The protection afforded a compilation extends to the original
arrangement and anything that copies West's original arrangement consti-
tutes a violation of its copyright. 1 5 1 According to West, page numbers are
an integral part of its arrangement. 152 Therefore, West argued that copy-
ing the numbers from West's reporters would be equivalent to copying its
arrangement. 153
Bender and HyperLaw, however, argued that they were not copying
West's arrangement of cases. 1 54 Rather, their use of star pagination "states
afact-where certain public domain matter, i.e., a passage from ajudicial
opinion, is located in a parallel source-and nothing more."'1 55
149. See West Publ'g Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1571, 1575 (D.
Minn. 1985) (holding that West's page numbers were protected by copyright as
part of its arrangement of cases); see also Oasis Publ'g Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 924 F.
Supp. 918, 925 (D. Minn. 1996) (same).
150. See Bender, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1322 (explaining West's position on star pag-
ination). In a compilation, the protectable expression is the arrangement and ac-
cording to West, "arrangement has everything to do with where case reports are
found in volumes and how they are displayed and how they are reported by West."
Id.
151. See id. at 1324 (discussing extent of copyright protection).
152. See id. (arguing that West's arrangement "has everything to do" with
place in volume in which case appears).
153. See id. (arguing compilation copyright protects "entire work as a whole").
West claimed that the page numbers were essential to the arrangement of its re-
porters. See id.
154. See Matthew Bender's Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, at 14, Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., No. 94 CIV. 0589, 1997 WL
266972 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1997) available at <http://www.hyperlaw.com/
mbsjbr.htm> (arguing that Bender did not violate West's copyright). Bender com-
pared Volume 1 of Federal Reporter-Third Series to its New York product. See id.
The nine Second Circuit opinions that appeared in Volume 1 were arranged con-
secutively by West. See id. In the New York product, however, those nine cases
were interspersed across 37 cases. See id. The New York product included cases
that appeared on LEXIS but not in the West reporter. See id. In addition,
Bender's product did not arrange opinions in separate volumes as West did. See id.
Thus, Bender argued that there was no "actionable similarity between West's and
Bender's arrangement of cases." Id.
155. Id. (quoting Patterson &Joyce, supra note 24, at 758 n.137). In its brief,
Bender attacked West's theory that page numbers reflected original elements of
West's compilation, stating that the theory "rests on a false factual premise-that
star pagination is intended to and does relate to arrangement." Id. Instead, ac-
cording to Bender, "the information conveyed by star pagination is present solely
to state a fact about the location of text in a parallel source." Id.; see Patterson &
Joyce, supra note 24, at 758 n.137 (stating emphatically that star pagination does
not reflect case arrangement). According to two prominent commentators on the
subject, "star pagination of judicial reports has nothing whatsoever to do with case
arrangement-that is, with how cases are arranged in the original report or, for that
matter, the subsequent report containing the star pagination." Id. Star pagina-
tion, in this view, reflects nothing more than simple facts. See id.
902
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The court expressed serious doubts concerning West's position on
the star pagination issue.156 According to the court, the main flaw with
West's argument was that the page number on which a court opinion ap-
pears is a fact.15 7 Because facts themselves can never be protected by
copyright, the page numbers are free for anyone to copy.
158
Although West admitted that a page number is a fact, it attempted to
distinguish between preexisting facts that exist independent of the compi-
lation and facts that are the result of the creation of the compilation.'
59
West contended that the page numbers of reporters result from the crea-
tion of the compilation. 1 60 Therefore, West's copyright protected the
page numbers.' 61
Despite West's arguments, the court refused to distinguish between
preexisting facts and facts that were the result of West's compilation.
1 62
Instead, the court ruled that page numbers were facts that were not pro-
tected by copyright. 163 Next, the court rejected West's argument that its
156. See Bender, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1321 ("But it seems to me . .. that the title
and the citation to a West reported decision are facts, facts that anybody is free to
use.").
157. See id. According to the court, page numbers were not the result of
West's creative activity. See id. The court noted that West's selection of cases or its
headnotes were parts of the compilation that were original creations, page num-
bers, however, did not meet the required standard. See id. at 1329-30. In the
court's view, all that West did was decide how to compile the cases. See id. at 1321.
The page numbers were the accidental consequence of that decision. See id. at
1321-22. From this reasoning, the court concluded that the page number of a case
was merely a fact and not protected by copyright. See id. at 1322.
158. See id. at 1329-30 (holding that page numbers are facts that can not be
protected by copyright and therefore can be copied at will).
159. See id. at 1322 (arguing that page numbers, while facts, should still be
protected by copyright). To illustrate its point, West used the example of an ad-
dress and phone number. See id. A person's address and phone number exists
regardless of whether they are ever compiled into a telephone directory. See id.
On the other hand, according to West, a slip opinion issued by a court would "not
have a volume number, West Reporter publication name and page number in-
dependent of the compilation and creation of an arrangement by West .... Id.
West claimed that because the "facts" here are the result of the creation of an
arrangement, they should be protected by copyright. Cf id. (distinguishing be-
tween preexisting facts and facts that are dependent on compilation).
160. See id. (arguing that page numbers were facts that would not exist in-
dependent of West's creation).
161. See id. (claiming that any publisher that copies arrangement is copying
protectable interest). In making this argument, West was trying to distinguish its
case from Feist. See id. ("fflou cannot rely on the defense that these are facts be-
cause they are not the kind of preexisting facts dealt with by the Supreme Court in
Feist.").
162. See generally id. at 1321. The court did not specifically address West's
argument on this point. See generally id. Rather, the court took the position early
in the proceedings that a page number was a fact, making no distinction between
preexisting facts and facts that were the result of West's creation. See generally id.
The court did not waiver from this position. See generally id. at 1321-22.
163. See id. at 1329 (reiterating that facts set forth in compilation are not pro-
tected by copyright).
19981 NOTE
31
Petretti: Matthew Bender & (and) Co. v. West Publishing Co.: The End of Wes
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
page numbers were part of a compilation and an essential part of its ar-
rangement. 164 The court viewed page numbers as an "accident," a mere
consequence of the way that a reporter is compiled.1 65 The court stated
that the case might be different had Bender or HyperLaw copied West's
arrangement in its entirety, but that was not the situation in this case. 1 66
Thus, the court granted both plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment
on the star pagination issue.
1 6 7
2. The Text of Opinions
At trial, West argued that it had a protectable interest in its compila-
tions and that copying West's cases was an infringement of its copyright.168
164. See id. (stating copyright protection extends to aspects of compilation
that embody original creation of compiler). In rejecting West's argument, the
court stated that a page number is not part of West's original contribution. See id.
at 1322 (commenting that page number "is a consequence of the way the compila-
tion is put together, but it is not any part of the aspect of compilation that embody
the original creation of the compiler"); see also Patterson &Joyce, supra note 24, at
758 n.137 (arguing star pagination of judicial reports has nothing to do with ar-
rangement of cases). The court went even further in minimizing West's role in
creating page numbers, referring to them as completely accidental. See Bender, 41
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1322 (concluding that page numbers were mere "accident[s] as to
the page upon which a particular portion of text falls").
This view is in direct contrast with the Eighth Circuit's decision in Mead and
the district court's holding in Oasis. For a discussion of both Mead and Oasis, see
supra notes 97-118 and accompanying text.
165. See Bender, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1322 ("[T]he essence of the protectable
compilation has nothing to do with the accident as to the page upon which a
particular portion of text falls.").
166. See id. at 1323 (explaining that Bender and HyperLaw were not copying
West's arrangement in its entirety). As far as the court was concerned, the plain-
tiffs were simply making references to specific cites within one of West's reporters
and were not copying West's work product. See id. The court then distinguished
this situation from a clear example of infringement. See id. If the plaintiffs were
just taking one of West's volumes and putting it in CD-ROM format, that would be
a clear case of infringement because that would be copying West's skill and origi-
nality. See id. (stating that Bender's product contained some cases that are re-
ported by West and others that are not).
167. See id. at 1330 ("[W] here and on what particular pages the text of a court
opinion appears does not embody any original creation of the compiler, and,
therefore ... is not entitled to protection."). In addition, it is apparent that both
the United States Constitution and West's "monopoly" of the legal publishing mar-
ket played some part in the court's decisionmaking process. See id. at 1325, 1329
(mentioning Article 1, § 8 of Constitution and West's attempt to monopolize re-
ported decisions). The court stated that "[w] hat West is attempting to do by try-
ing to inhibit star pagination is to create a monopoly over reported court
decisions." See id. at 1329.
168. See generally Transcript, Jan. 27-28, 1997 Trial, at 5-6 Matthew Bender &
Co. v. West Publ'g Co., No. 94 CIV. 0589, 1997 WL 266972 (S.D.N.Y. May 19,
1997), available at <http://www.hyperlaw.com/trialtr.htm> (arguing that West's
compilations were entitled to copyright protection). West argued that a court's
decisions, published in one of West's reporters with West's "enhancements," were
compilations. See id. at 6. West further claimed that as compilations, West did not
have to add anything substantial to a judicial opinion for the compilation to be
904 [Vol. 43: p. 873
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HyperLaw took the position that West's work on each individual opinion
must be judged by the standard of copyrightability applied to derivative
works, not compilations.1 6
9
The court quickly ended the argument by suggesting that this was not
a compilation case. 170 In the court's view, the compilation argument was
only appropriate as to the star pagination issue.' 71 The court held that to
determine whether HyperLaw could scan cases directly from West's re-
porters, the derivative works standard should be applied.1 72 Once the
copyrightable. See id. at 8. According to West, the test for copyrightability in such
a case is not whether it had made a substantial contribution to the opinion but
rather "whether or not there is any modicum, humble, crude, obvious, slight, mini-
mal creativity or judgment and it is beyond per adventure . . . ." Id. Under this
standard, West believed that the text of an opinion should be protected by copy-
right. See id. (stating belief that West's changes met modicum of creativity
standard).
169. See Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., No. 94 CIV. 0589, 1997
WL 266972, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1997) (stating HyperLaw's argument that
court should apply standards applicable to derivative works). HyperLaw con-
tended that they were not copying the order or arrangement of West's cases. See
id. Rather, HyperLaw argued that they were simply copying individual opinions
and "the extent of West's protectible interest in any single opinion must be deter-
mined under the standards that apply to derivative works." Id.
170. See Transcript, Jan. 27-28, 1997 Trial, at 6, Bender, 1997 WL 266972, avail-
able at <http://www.hyperlaw.com/trialtr.htm>.
171. See id. (explaining why compilation argument was proper in star pagina-
tion case). West was adamant in its position that this was a compilation case. See
id. West had hoped that the court would apply the compilation standard because
it could then claim a copyright in the selection and arrangement of its cases. Cf
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 52, § 3.02, at 3-5 (discussing differences between
compilations and derivative works). For a detailed discussion of compilations and
derivative works, see supra notes 55-67 and accompanying text.
For the purposes of West's chances of winning the case, the difference be-
tween the two is enormous. See generally Thomas Scheffey, A Tilting of the Tables,
CONN. LAw TRIBUNE, Feb. 3, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Ct File (stat-
ing "there is a world of difference" between compilations and derivative works). A
compilation can be copyrightable based solely on its selection and arrangement,
without any internal changes. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 52, § 3.02, at 3-5
(describing creation of copyrightable compilation). On the other hand, a deriva-
tive work must recast or transform the original work to such an extent as to qualify
as an "original work of authorship." See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining derivative
work). Once the court determined that the derivative works standard applied,
West had the more difficult task of proving that the changes it makes to each
individual case (e.g., corrections, adding attorneys names and parallel citations)
qualified as an original work of authorship. See Bender, 1997 WL 266972, at *2
("[T]he question presented is whether each reported decision found in the West
reports is an original work of West authorship.").
172. See Bender, 1997 WL 266972, at *1-*2 (deciding to apply standards appli-
cable to derivative works). At trial, the court gave a detailed description of why this
was not a compilation case. See generally Transcript, Jan. 27-28, 1997 Trial, at 309-
11, Bender, 1997 WL 266972, available at <http://www.hyperlaw.com/trialtr.htm>
(discussing reasons why this case involves derivative works, not compilations). The
court stated that HyperLaw would not be copying one entire volume in CD-ROM
format, rather it would be copying a case from that volume, which had previously
been cited by any case that HyperLaw included in its product. See id. at 310. The
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court determined that HyperLaw merely copied individual cases from
West's reporters and not West's arrangement, the number of cases that
HyperLaw copied became irrelevant because each individual case must
meet the originality standard to be protected by copyright. 17 3
West then argued that the changes it made to each case, for example
adding parallel citations, providing attorneys' names, making corrections
and implementing other modifications with respect to subsequent opin-
ions, were enough to make the reported decision independently copy-
rightable. 174 HyperLaw, however, stressed that copyright law and the
United States Constitution require that the changes made by West possess
a certain degree of originality in order to be copyrightable and the
changes that West made to each case did not meet this requirement. 175
In the court's view, West's argument was flawed because West at-
tempted to look at each individual change and argue that it substantially
changed a particular portion of the decision. 176 For example, the court
end result might be that HyperLaw copied every case of a particular volume, how-
ever, the court felt that it was still simply copying individual cases. See id.
173. See Bender, 1997 WL 266972, at *2 (stating that changes made must be
significant enough to qualify each reprint as independently copyrightable). "What
Hyperlaw [sic] is copying is the individual reported decision and the fact that it
copies one, two or a thousand decisions does not change the fact that it is the
decisions and not West's compilation of those decisions that Hyperlaw is copying."
Id. One important effect of this reasoning was that the scope of the case widened
significantly. See Scheffey, supra note 171, at 1 (commenting scope of case grew
from "bid to copy just 1 percent to 2 percent of West federal cases into 'wholesale
copying' of tens of thousands of those decisions").
174. See generally Bender, 1997 WL 266972, at *2-*4 (discussing changes West
makes to individual decisions). For a discussion of each change examined by the
court, see infra notes 176-96 and accompanying text.
175. See HyperLaw's Motion for Summary Judgment, at 15-17, Bender, 1997
WL 266972, available at <http://www.hyperlaw.com/hlsjfil.htm> (arguing that
West's changes are minor and trivial variations). Relying on L. Bailin, HyperLaw
argued that West uses "minuscule variations to original court text to appropriate
and monopolize public domain works." Id. at 17. HyperLaw also noted that no
matter how many changes West made to the text, the number was irrelevant if each
change was trivial. See id. at 18 ("[E]ven if a court were to find that some minimal
originality exists with regard to such changes-it must be more than a quantum of
originality."). Another problem with West's argument was that its changes, such as
changing "a short form citation to full form, 'prescribed' to 'proscribed', 'Consul'
to 'Consaul', 'Labor-Management' to 'Labor Management' (deleting the hypen),
'McGuiness' to 'MacGuineas', and 'NMF Hosp.' to 'NME Hosp.,' were im-
perceptible to the reader and driven primarily by a functional purpose, therefore
not protected by copyright. See id. at 19-20. Finally, HyperLaw added that West's
claim is further hampered by the "insurmountable obstacle that almost all of the
changes it makes to judicial opinions are facts." HyperLaw, Inc.'s Post-Trial Brief-
in-Chief-Challenge to West Text Copyright Claims at 24-25, Bender, 1997 WL
266972, at *1.
176. See Bender, 1997 WL 266972, at *2 (explaining court's perception of
West's argument). The court gave an example of the problem with West's argu-
ment: "West argues that it makes a substantial change to the cases cited in an
opinion when it adds a parallel citation. Even if this were a substantial change to
that citation, it is still a trivial change to the court's opinion." Id.
906 [Vol. 43: p. 873
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examined West's argument with regard to parallel citations.1 77 While it is
arguable that adding a parallel cite substantially changed the citation,
overall it is a trivial change to the reported decision. 178 Instead, the court
stated that in order to determine whether an individual opinion was enti-
tled to copyright protection, it was "necessary to look at the significance of
each individual change only for the purpose of determining whether the
totality of the changes made by West can be said to constitute 'an original
work of authorship.' 179 Therefore, the court examined each of the
changes West claimed to make in order to determine if the changes, in
totality, constituted an original work.1 80
The court first examined West's changes to case titles.1 81 In its analy-
sis, the court stated that case names were facts and that West's changes did
not vary to any significant extent from the universal rules of citation used
throughout the legal community. 18 2 Thus, the court concluded that the
changes West made to case titles did not involve "creative activity."1 83
Next, the court examined West's additions of the docket number and
the date argued and decided. 184 The court quickly dismissed these addi-
177. See id. (examining West's argument regarding parallel citations).
178. See id. (deciding that adding parallel citation, while possibly substantial
change to that citation, was trivial change to court's opinion as whole). According
to the court, West had taken the wrong approach. See id. (rejecting West's analy-
sis). Instead of looking at each change to each particular piece of information, the
correct analysis would be to look at the changes in respect to the entire reported
decision. See id. To determine whether an opinion was entitled to copyright pro-
tection, the court ruled that it had to examine the totality of the changes made by
West to determine whether West's version of the opinion was an original work of
authorship. See id.
179. Id.
180. See generally id. at *3-*4 (examining individual changes made by West for
purpose of determining whether work as whole is original).
181. See id. at *3 (examining and explaining changes West makes in title of
cases). Basically West capitalizes the names, or portions of the names, used in
citing the case. See id. Also, West abbreviates portions of parties' names, "some-
times combine[s] captions when two or more cases are reported together and
make[s] other minor changes to ensure that a consistent form is used in all re-
ported decisions." Id.
182. See id. (critiquing changes West makes to case names). The court ac-
knowledged some differences between West's changes and Bluebook rules, but it
remarked that those differences were little more than trivial. See id. (stating that
.the differences do not appear to be of major significance").
183. See id. (stating that changes in title are simply mechanical application of
preexisting rules of citation).
184. See id. (discussing West's addition of docket numbers and dates). At
trial, a West employee testified that West got the docket number from the slip copy
issued by the court. See Transcript, Jan. 27-28, 1997 Trial, at 23, Bender, 1997 WL
266972, available at <http://www.hyperlaw.com/trialtr.htm>. West inserts "No.,"
rearranges the docket number according to West's style and puts a period at the
end. See id. There was also testimony regarding the addition of and changes to
dates made by West. See id. at 24. Besides making the initial decision to publish
both the "argued" and "decided" dates, West also puts the dates in West's style and
format. See id.
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tions as "'raw facts [that] may be copied at will.' ",185 Despite West's efforts
in obtaining this information, there was nothing in the expression of these
facts that entitled it to copyright protection.1 8 6 Next, the court addressed
West's claims that it had a protectable interest in the publication of attor-
neys' names.I8 7 The court reasoned that although West exerts some time
and energy when collecting the names and makes an editorial decision as
to which names to publish, the names "are facts which West cannot
copyright."1 88
The court also reviewed the changes West made to the text of the
opinions. 189 West made two types of changes to the text: corrections and
additions. 190 West proofread each case and checked the form and sub-
stance of each cite. 191 Occasionally, West would contact the court to de-
termine if there was an error in an opinion.1 92 Again, the court ruled that
despite West's considerable effort, these corrections were not evidence of
creativity or originality.
19 3
185. Bender, 1997 WL 266972, at *3 (quoting Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991)). "These are clearly facts and even though
West must make some effort to obtain some of this information, there is nothing
so original about West's expression of these facts that would entitle them to copy-
right protection." Id. (citing Feist, 499 U.S. at 349). As facts, it was "'neither unfair
or [sic] unfortunate"' that HyperLaw copied them, "'[i]t is the means by which
copyright advances the progress of science and art."' Id. (quoting Feist, 499 U.S. at
349).
186. See id. (deciding docket number and date were not protected by
copyright).
187. See generally id. (discussing copyrightability of names of attorneys). West's
treatment of names is similar to its treatment of dates and docket numbers. See
generally Transcript, Jan. 27-28 Trial, at 16, Bender, 1997 WL 266972, available at
<http://www.hyperlaw.com/trialtr.htm> (discussing West's treatment of attorneys'
names). West obtains the name of the attorney from the court's docket sheet and
merges the name with West's case report. See id. West also adds the city and state
in which the attorney practices; it obtains this information from West's Legal Di-
rectory or Bar Association journals. See id. at 19.
188. Bender, 1997 WL 266972, at *3 (citing Feist, 499 U.S. at 360).
189. See id. at *4 (addressing textual changes made by West).
190. See id. (explaining West's changes to text of court's opinion).
191. See id. (discussing West's procedure when proofreading court opinions
that it includes in reporter). West hires a number of editors and cite checkers;
when proofreading, these employees check for, and correct, any spelling errors
and any mistakes in the form or substance of a citation. See id.
192. See id. (stating West may contact courts to check on possible corrections);
see also Transcript, Jan. 27-28 Trial, at 34-35, Bender, 1997 WL 266972, available at
<http://www.hyperlaw.com/trialtr.htm> (discussing instances in which West does
and does not contact court to check possible corrections).
193. See Bender, 1997 WL 266972, at *4 ("While West clearly expends consider-
able time and money on this effort and performs a valuable service to the bench
and the bar, there is no element of creativity or originality involved in these
corrections.").
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Lastly, the court noted two different types of additions made by West:
filling in the blanks and parallel citations.194 In each case, West per-
formed mechanical searches and added nothing more than facts to the
case.1 95 Therefore, neither type of addition reached the level of creativity
needed to invoke copyright protection.
19 6
After undergoing this analysis, the court concluded that the changes
West makes to reported opinions are trivial and, "taken separately or col-
lectively, they do not result in 'a distinguishable variation' of the opinion
written by the court.' 97 Accordingly, the court held that HyperLaw did
not, and would not, violate West's copyrights by copying opinions from
West's reporters.
198
B. Critical Analysis
The district court's decision in Bender, concerning both star pagina-
tion and the text of opinions, is correct.1 9 9 The court's decision is the
most reasonable conclusion in light of the facts of the case and relevant
194. See id. (discussing how West filled in blanks and added parallel citations);
see also Transcript, Jan. 27-28 Trial, at 31, Bender, 1997 WL 266972, available at
<http://www.hyperlaw.com/trialtr.htm> (same). The process of filling in the
blanks involves "a reference back to a portion of the same opinion or a blank left
in a citation." Bender, 1997 WL 266972, at *4. According to the court, any search
conducted by West when they attempt to fill in the blanks is a mechanical exercise
that does not involve creativity. See id. (stating that filling in blanks is "[a] mechan-
ical search for and addition of facts").
West adds the parallel citations that it believes are necessary for readers to use
the National Reporter System. See Transcript, supra note 149, at 31 (discussing
West's choice of parallel citations). West obtains its parallel cites from either
West's library or its Insta-Cite system. See id. (explaining where West finds its paral-
lel citations). "[T] he selections made tend to conform to the standard of the legal
profession and appear consistent with those recommended in [The Bluebook] A
Uniform System of Citation." Bender, 1997 WL 266972, at *4.
195. See Bender, 1997 WL 266972, at *4 (discussing filling in of blanks and
parallel citations). The court viewed the addition of parallel citations as "[tihe
most significant additions that West makes to the opinions." Id. Despite the sig-
nificance that the court attached to this addition, parallel citations were still not
considered original. See id. (holding that parallel citations "reflect no level of
originality").
196. See id. (ruling that additions made by West are basically mechanical and
do not represent sufficient originality to invoke copyright protection).
197. Id. (citing Waldman Publ'g Corp. v. Landell, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 782 (2d
Cir. 1994)).
198. See id. at *5 (holding HyperLaw's copying of West's reports does not vio-
late West's copyright).
199. For a narrative analysis of the court's decision in Bender, see supra notes
146-98 and accompanying text. Although other courts have reached the opposite
conclusion on similar facts, the court in Bender has the more persuasive analysis in
light of the relevant background. But see West Publ'g Co. v. Mead Data Central,
Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1227 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that page numbers of West's
reporters were protected by copyright); Oasis Publ'g Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 924 F.
Supp. 918, 923-24 (D. Minn. 1996) (same). For a further discussion of the con-
trary rulings in Mead and Oasis, see supra notes 97-118 and accompanying text.
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background, including the Constitution's purpose in providing copyright
protection, relevant case law and the Copyright Act of 1976.200
1. Star Pagination
In Bender, the court ruled that West did not have a protectable inter-
est in the page numbers of its reporters.20 1 The decision directly conflicts
with two earlier decisions in other courts.20 2 Nevertheless, the court's rul-
ing in Bender is rational in light of the relevant background. 20 3 The deci-
sion is clearly supported by the Constitution's goal of promoting learning,
the Supreme Court's holding in Wheaton and the Second Circuit's holding
in Lawyers' Co-operative.20 4 Moreover, the appropriateness of the court's
holding is evident when compared with the Oasis holding. 20 5
The Constitution's justification for granting Congress the power to
enact copyright legislation is to promote learning or, as the Constitution
states, to promote the "Progress of Science." 20 6 This goal is the "premier
doctrine of copyright law." 20 7 To further the goal, copyright law must
limit an author's monopoly because a monopoly impedes learning..20 8
While it is true that the Constitution also secures an author's "exclusive
Right" to his or her work, that right is solely for the purpose of encourag-
ing the creation of new works, thereby promoting learning.209
200. For a discussion of the facts of the case, see supra notes 119-45 and ac-
companying text. For a discussion of the Constitution and copyright law, see supra
notes 23-27 and accompanying text. For a discussion of relevant case law, see supra
notes 28-42 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Copyright Act of 1976,
see supra notes 43-67 and accompanying text.
201. See Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321, 1330
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding page numbers are not embodiment of original creation
and therefore not protected by copyright).
202. Compare id., with Mead, 799 F.2d at 1227 (holding that page numbers of
West's reporters were protected by copyright), and Oasis, 924 F. Supp. at 923-24
(same).
203. Cf Dahl, supra note 68, at 714 (arguing that Mead abandoned years of
precedent in holding that West's pagination was protectable); Wyman, supra note
5, at 244-45 ("The Mead holding is thus at odds with the current thought underly-
ing Wheaton and its progeny.").
204. For a discussion of the Constitution's goal of enhancing the public do-
main through copyright, see supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text. For a dis-
cussion of the Supreme Court's holding in Wheaton, see supra notes 28-34 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's holding in Lawyers'
Co-operative, see supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
205. For a discussion of the facts of Bender, see supra notes 119-45 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of Oasis, see supra notes 113-18 and accompanying
text.
206. See Patterson & Joyce, supra note 24, at 783 (discussing constitutional
imperative of promoting learning).
207. Id.
208. See id. at 786 (arguing that monopoly must be limited because monopoly
is antithetical to learning).
209. See id. at 787 (explaining that purpose of granting "exclusive Right" was
to promote learning by encouraging new works); see also Harper & Row, Publish-
[Vol. 43: p. 873
38
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 4 [1998], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss4/3
The Bender court's decision to deny copyright protection to page
numbers is correct because it furthers the Constitution's goal of promot-
ing learning.210 A decision that would subject page numbers to copyright
protection has two potential effects: (1) impeding access to the law by re-
stricting the development of new technologies, such as Bender's and
HyperLaw's CD-ROM products, or (2) allowing West to impose a tax in
the form of licensing fees on rival publishers.2 1' Both results would in-
hibit the progress of science and therefore, decisions such as Mead and
Oasis, where the court protected page numbers, would actually be at odds
with the Copyright Clause of the Constitution.2 1 2 Thus, the Bender court's
decision is consistent with constitutional principles.
2 13
Similarly, the Bender decision is consistent with the policy established
by the Supreme Court in Wheaton.214 In Wheaton, the Court established
that the public should have "maximum, unimpeded access to the law."
21 5
ers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) ("'The monopoly power cre-
ated by copyright . . . rewards the individual author in order to benefit the
public."' (quoting Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477
(1984))).
210. Cf Patterson &Joyce, supra note 24, at 810 (stating that protecting page
numbers in no way "Promote[s] the Progress of Science").
211. See id. (explaining how protecting page numbers inhibits legal science).
Protecting page numbers produces one of two results:
[E]ither it impedes more efficient access to the law by restricting the use
of competitors' developing technologies, as occurred prior to the settle-
ment in [Mead]; or it in effect imposes a tax for the use of the law,
preventing effective price competition by sanctioning the imposition of
license fees on the publisher's rivals.
Id.
212. Cf id. (arguing that "protecting page... numbers in legal materials...
in no way 'Promote[s] the Progress of Science"'). The decision in Bender is also
consistent with the other constitutional goals. For a discussion of the other consti-
tutional goals, see supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. By not protecting
page numbers, the court did not violate the Constitution's goal of granting an
author exclusive rights to his or her work because "cases and statutes are not the
products of authorship; and, without authorship, there is no right to profit from
copyright protection." Patterson &Joyce, supra note 24, at 810. The elements of
reporters, which West claims are protected by copyright, are discretionary and
therefore original expression is lacking. See id. (explaining why West is not an
author). "As to such features, the publisher is a publisher rather than an author,
and not entitled to the protection of a copyright monopoly." Id. Finally, the goal
of enhancing the public domain is furthered by the Bender decision. Cf id. at 810-
11 (explaining that, unlike Bender, Mead inhibited access to public domain materi-
als). By denying protection to page numbers, the court has paved the way for
greater development in the area of computer assisted access to the law, thereby
enhancing the public domain. Cf id. (criticizing Mead for inhibiting access to pub-
lic domain materials through computer technology).
213. Cf id. at 811 (arguing that Mead decision failed to "ensure the fulfill-
ment of the three doctrinal imperatives [of the Constitution]").
214. See generally Wyman, supra note 5, at 244-45 (discussing policy established
by Wheaton and its progeny). For a further discussion of Wheaton, see supra notes
28-34 and accompanying text.
215. See Wyman, supra note 5, at 244 ("The public policy... [Wheaton] fur-
thers is one of maximum, unimpeded access to the law."); see also Patterson &
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The Bender court clearly followed this policy by denying copyright protec-
tion to West's page numbers.2 16 On the other hand, the Mead and Oasis
decisions were clearly contrary to this policy because those decisions po-
tentially prevented many legal publishers from entering the market. 217 In
Bender, however, the court opened the door for legal publishers, such as
Bender and HyperLaw, to develop products that contain judicial opinions,
creating new sources of judicial materials at lower costs, and thereby pro-
viding the public with "maximum, unimpeded access to the law."'218
Finally, the Bender court followed the precedent established by the
Second Circuit in Lawyers' Co-operative.2 19 In Lawyers' Co-operative, the Sec-
ond Circuit declined to rule that the mere use of page numbers consti-
tuted copyright infringement. 220 Instead, the court concluded that page
numbers of a reporter "are, as a matter of public policy, insufficient intel-
Joyce, supra note 24, at 742 (claiming that bedrock policy of Wheaton is that people
should have maximum access to law).
216. See, e.g., Thomas Scheffey, West Ruling's Effects Seen as Far-Reaching; Com-
pany Can't Stop Rivals from Copying Cases from Its Books, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP.,
May 30, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fulton File ("[The Bender decision]
releases West's stranglehold on primary law materials ... and will allow publishers
on CD-ROM or the Web to connect cases and statutes in whatever way proves most
useful to lawyers and the public.").
217. Cf Wyman, supra note 5, at 245-46 (explaining how Mead has impeded
public's access to law). The courts in both Mead and Oasis seemed more con-
cerned with the potential effect on West's standing in the legal publishing market
than public policy concerns. See id. at 252. "[B]oth Oasis and Mead eschewed any
public policy analysis and found that the mere possibility of market harm to West
was sufficient to warrant extending copyright protection to West's pagination." Id.
218. See id. at 245. As a result of Mead and Oasis, West maintained its control
over published court opinions, and other legal publishers were effectively elimi-
nated from competing in the market. Cf id. at 245-46 (noting that extension of
copyright protection to page numbers, in Mead and Oasis, essentially retarded legal
"science"). The reason for this result is that potential legal publishers were left
with three choices: 1) use West's page numbers without West's permission and face
a lawsuit; 2) enter into a licensing agreement with West for the use of its page
numbers; or 3) refrain from publishing the law. Cf id. Many publishers could not
afford either of the first two options so they refrained from legal publishing, so
that West "exert[ed] a quasi-monopolistic control over access to the law [and] ...
[t]o a great degree, then, legal science end[ed] up being held hostage .... " Id. at
246.
219. See Banks Law Publ'g Co. v. Lawyers' Co-operative Publ'g Co., 169 F. 386,
391 (2d Cir. 1909) (per curiam) (holding that page numbers of reporters were not
protected by copyright).
220. See Wyman, supra note 5, at 244 (stating that Second Circuit had oppor-
tunity to protect page numbers but declined to do so). The Court in Callaghan
also had this opportunity and, like the court in Lawyers' Co-operative, declined to do
so. See id. The Court in Callaghan found that a case reporter as a whole was enti-
tled to copyright protection. See generally Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 662
(1888) (holding case reporter was entitled to copyright protection). It did so,
however, in the context of a case in which an entire reporter, including headnotes
and arguments of counsel, were copied. See id. at 659. On the other hand, Lawyers'
Co-operative dealt directly with page numbers and arrangement, and directly denied
protection to such details. See Lawyers' Co-operative, 169 F. at 390 (holding that page
numbers did not warrant copyright protection). Therefore, the Mead court's reli-
912 [Vol. 43: p. 873
40
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 4 [1998], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss4/3
lectual labor to warrant copyright protection."22 1 While the court in
Bender did not specifically mention Lawyers' Co-operative, it followed the
same reasoning by concluding that protectable expression "has nothing to
do with the accident as to the page upon which a particular portion of text
falls." 222
2. The Text of Opinions
Based on the facts of this case, the decision to deny copyright protec-
tion to opinions published by West is appropriate in light of the Copyright
Act of 1976 and is consistent with relevant case law on the subject.22 3 A
careful reading of the 1976 Act shows that the court's decision to apply the
standard for derivative works to the text of opinions was correct.
224
Individual cases in West's reporters should be treated as derivative
works under the 1976 Act. 225 Compilations are formed by the collection
of preexisting materials and are afforded copyright protection only to the
extent that the selection, coordination and arrangement of that material
constitutes an original work of authorship. 226 In contrast, a derivative
work simply recasts or transforms an original work.2 2 7
ance on Callaghan was misplaced. For a further discussion of this conclusion, see
supra notes 104-05.
221. Wyman, supra note 5, at 227 (citing Lawyers' Co-operative, 169 F. at 390).
The district court in Lawyers' Co-operative concluded that "for another to simply
adopt the plan of groupings of the cases, making marginal references to the pag-
ing of the volumes . . . without in any way pirating the substance of his [or her]
origination, is not enough... to establish infringement." Lawyers' Co-operative, 169
F. at 387. The Second Circuit agreed with the decision and adopted the district
court's opinion, reiterating that page numbers are not entitled to copyright pro-
tection. See id. at 391.
222. Matthew Bender & Co. .v. West Publ'g Co.; 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321, 1322
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). Compare Bender, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1330 (holding that page num-
bers of reporters were not copyrightable), with Lawyers' Co-operative, 169 F. at 390
(concluding that copying page numbers without copying substance of original ma-
terial was not enough to establish infringement of copyright). The court in Bender,
as in Lawyers Co-operative, also ruled that pagination could not be protected by
copyright because "where and on what particular pages the text of a court opinion
appears does not embody any original creation of the compiler, and therefore ...
is not entitled to protection." Id. at 1330.
223. For a further discussion of the 1976 Act, see supra notes 43-96 and ac-
companying text. For a further discussion of the relevant case law, see supra notes
28-42.
224. For a further discussion of the 1976 Act, see supra notes 43-96 and ac-
companying text.225. For a further discussion of the 1976 Act, see supra notes 43-96 and ac-
companying text. For a detailed discussion of the meaning of derivative works, see
supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
226. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1994) (defining compilation and explaining re-
quirements for copyright of compilation). For further explanation of compila-
tions, see supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
227. See id. § 101 (defining derivative work).
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To violate the copyright of a compilation, a party would have to copy
the selection, coordination or arrangement of the compilation. 2 28 In
Bender, HyperLaw did not copy West's selection, coordination or arrange-
ment of cases. 229 HyperLaw only copied individual reported decisions. 230
Even if HyperLaw were to copy every case in one of West's reporters, as
long as it did not copy the arrangement of those cases, the derivative works
standard would apply. 231 Therefore, the court was correct in concluding
that each case should be judged by the standards that apply to derivative
works. 23 2
After making this decision, the court determined that the changes
West made to its reported decisions do not represent a sufficiently creative
effort to warrant copyright protection. 23 3 To determine whether these
changes were creative, the court conducted a methodical examination of
each change West made to the text of the opinions. 234 The court con-
cluded that the changes did not result in a distinguishable variation. 2 35
The court reached this conclusion -through proper use of the relevant
cases dealing with creativity. 236
228. Cf Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321, 1329(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating copyright protection for compilations extends only to
those aspects that embody creation of compiler, i.e., selection, coordination or
arrangement).
229. See Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., No. 94 CIV. 0589, 1997
WL 266972, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1997) (stating that HyperLaw was not copying
West's arrangement of cases); see also Transcript, Jan. 27-28 Trial, at 309-11, Bender,
1997 WL 266972, available at <http://www.hyperlaw.com/trialtr.htm> (discussing
why this is not compilation case). For a further discussion of the court's reasoning
in determining that this was not a compilation case, see supra notes 169-72 and
accompanying text.
230. See Bender, 1997 WL 266972, at *2 (stating that HyperLaw copied individ-
ual decisions); see also Transcript, Jan. 27-28 Trial, at 309-11, Bender, 1997 WL
266972, available at <http://www.hyperlaw.com/trialtr.htm> (discussing
HyperLaw's copying of individual cases).
231. See Bender, 1997 WL 266972, at *2 (concluding that number of cases cop-
ied by HyperLaw does not transform this situation into compilation case).
232. See id. (concluding "that the correct analysis is that which applies to de-
rivative works").
233. See id. (ruling that changes West makes to opinions do not make deci-
sions copyrightable).
234. See id. at *2-*3 (discussing each of West's changes). Before beginning its
analysis, the court stated that "it is necessary to look at the significance of each
individual change ... for the purpose of determining whether the totality of the
changes made by West can be said to constitute 'an original work of authorship."'
Id. at *2.
235. See id. at *4 ("In sum, each of the changes that West makes to the cases it
reports are trivial and ... do not result in 'a distinguishable variation' of the opin-
ion written by the court.") (citing Wa.ldman Publ'g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d
775, 782 (2d Cir. 1994)).
236. See, e.g., L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976)(holding that substantial variation is necessary to support copyright for derivative
work). For a discussion of the relevant cases dealing with creativity, see supra notes
68-96 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 43: p. 873
42
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 4 [1998], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss4/3
The court quickly dismissed as immaterial the time and money West
spends in making changes to opinions. 2 37 The court conceded that West
potentially made many changes to the text of an individual opinion, but
the mere number is irrelevant. 238 Thus, the court correctly focused on
the nature of West's changes, not the number of changes made.239
After examining the nature of the changes, the court determined that
West's additions of attorneys' names, docket numbers and date argued
and decided are facts which are not protected by copyright law. 240 It is a
well-established rule that facts are not copyrightable. 24 1 The court cor-
rectly applied the rule in this case because the additions are facts, not
substantive changes. 242 Even West admitted that attorneys' names and
docket numbers either appear on the slip opinions or can be obtained by
anyone with little effort.243 Although West also added parallel citations
and made changes to the titles of the cases, these changes involve a
mechanical application of the universal rules of citation. 244 Such a
mechanical procedure does not involve sufficient creativity to qualify for
copyright protection. 245 In addition, while West's process of proofreading
and correcting each case is time consuming, it is not creative. 24 6 Also,
237. See Bender, 1997 WL 266972, at *3 (discussing time and money expended
by West in making some changes). Instead of focusing on time and money spent
by West, the court concentrated on the constitutionally mandated element of crea-
tivity. See id. Here, the court correctly applied the guidelines established by the
Supreme Court in Feist, when it rejected the "sweat of the brow" approach to origi-
nality. See generally Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359-
60 (1991) (rejecting "sweat of the brow" doctrine).
238. Cf Grove Press, Inc. v. Collectors Publication, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 603, 606
(C.D. Cal. 1967) (denying copyright protection of work containing 40,000 trivial
changes). For a further discussion of Grove Press, see supra note 94.
239. See generally Bender, 1997 WL 266972, at *2-*4 (discussing nature of each
change and examining work in its entirety).
240. See id. at *3 (finding docket number and date argued and decided to be
facts).
241. See, e.g., Feist, 499 U.S. at 351 ("In no event may copyright extend to facts
themselves.").
242. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1988) (declaring that "words and short phrases
such as names, titles, and slogans" cannot be protected by copyright).
243. See Transcript, Jan. 27-28 Trial, at 23, Bender, 1997 WL 266972, available at
<http://www.hyperlaw.com/trialtr.htm> (stating that West gets docket number
and dates from slip copies issued by court).
244. See Bender, 1997 WL 266972, at *4 (stating that addition of parallel cita-
tions and changes to title are mechanical application of preexisting rules of
citation).
245. Cf Entertainment Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis Creative Group, Inc.,
853 F. Supp. 319, 322 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (concluding that changes that are driven
primarily by functional, utilitarian or mechanical purposes should not be consid-
ered in attempt to determine if work is original).
246. See Groves Press, Inc. v. Collectors Publication, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 603,
605 (C.D. Cal. 1967) (holding that changes in course of proofreading are trivial).
In some cases West contacts the judge who wrote the opinion and the judge will
actually make the correction. See Bender, 1997 WL 266972, at *4 (stating that West
contacts court to discuss possible mistakes). The work of a judge can not be the
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West's corrections are imperceptible to the reader and therefore should
not be protected by copyright. 247 Any hope of having these changes pro-
tected by copyright rested solely on the "sweat of the brow" theory, which
granted copyright protection based on the compiler's labor, that was re-
jected by Feist.248 Therefore, the court correctly dismissed the possibility
of copyright protection for West's corrections.
249
To summarize, although West expends great effort in making
changes to judicial opinions, that effort is not relevant in determining the
issue of originality. 25°) The 1976 Act clearly states that a work will be pro-
tected by copyright only if it is an original work of authorship. 25 1 The
changes West makes to its reported decisions do not vary substantially
from the work of the judges. 252 Because the cases West publishes are not
creative, they are not an original work of authorship and cannot be pro-
tected by copyright.2 53 Therefore, the conclusions and reasoning of the
court in Bender are correct.25 4
subject of a copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1994) (stating work of U.S. Government
cannot be protected by copyright); see also Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253
(1888) (holding that "no copyright could ... be secured in the products of the
labor done by judicial officers in the discharge of their judicial duties").
247. See EFS Mktg., Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 836 F. Supp. 128, 133 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) ("Minuscule variations of otherwise preexisting craftsmanship that are im-
perceptible to the casual observer are insufficient to obtain copyright protection.") (emphasis
added). Although West may make a number of changes to any one case, those
changes are not distinguishable from the original text. See HyperLaw's Motion for
Summary Judgment at 9-10, Bender, 1997 WL 266972, available at <http://
www.hyperlaw.com/hlsjfin> (arguing that West's changes can not be distinguished
from court's original opinion). West has admitted that a reader cannot determine
the difference between West's changes and the original text. See id. at 10. ("West
has... conceded the practical impossibility of ascertaining which of the changes to
the original court opinion were authored by West.").
248. See generally Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
353 (1991) (rejecting "sweat of the brow" doctrine). The vast majority of West's
changes involve "page numbering, capitalization, spelling corrections and cites."
HyperLaw's Motion for Summary Judgment at 11, Bender, 1997 WL 266972, avail-
able at <http://www.hyperlaw.com/hlsjfin>. "This is a classic case of 'sweat of the
brow."' Id. For a further discussion of the "sweat of the brow" doctrine and the
Supreme Court's rejection of it in Feist, see supra note 60. For a further discussion
of the changes made by West, see supra notes 180-97 and accompanying text.
249. See Bender, 1997 WL 266972, at *4 (rejecting argument that West's correc-
tions are protected by copyright).
250. See generally Feist, 499 U.S. at 353 (rejecting "sweat of the brow" doctrine).
251. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994) (stating copyright protects "original works of
authorship"). For a further discussion of the originality requirement, see supra
notes 68-96 and accompanying text.
252. See Bender, 1997 WL 266972, at *4 (holding that West's changes do not
result in distinguishable variation).
253. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (protecting only works of original authorship).
254. For a discussion of the reasoning and conclusions of the court in Bender,
see supra notes 146-98 and accompanying text.
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V. THE IMPACT OF BENDER ON THE LEGAL PUBLISHING MARKET, THE
FUTURE OF LEGAL RESEARCH AND THE COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
OF FACTUAL COMPILATIONS
The district court's decision in Bender may have A potentially devastat-
ing effect on West's legal publishing empire.2 55 The impact of the deci-
sion might lead to an erosion of West's profits. 256 West will no longer be
able to collect money from legal publishers for licensing agreements.
2 57
Because its page numbers are no longer protected by copyright, competi-
tors will be able to copy the numbers at will, without paying a fee. 2 58 West
can potentially lose tens of millions of dollars from the loss of these fees
alone. 25
9
The free use of star pagination will allow smaller publishers, who pre-
viously could not compete with West because of prohibitive licensing fees,
to enter the legal publishing market.2 60 This will lead to greater competi-
tion, potentially driving down the price of legal research.26 1 Also, West's
255. See David CayJohnston, The Media Business; West Publishing Loses a Decision
on Copyright, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1997, at DI (discussing potential impact of Bender
decision on West's business).
256. See id. (stating that experts expect decision to allow new competition to
emerge that "would erode West Publishing's profit margins"). Several experts in
copyright and electronic publishing commented that the impact of the decision
could be far reaching. See id. (commenting on potential impact of Bender). The
experts that were questioned believed that the decision could lead to increased
competition in the field of legal research. See id. Due to the increased competi-
tion, the price of research would drop, leading one legal publisher to proclaim
that "West's monopoly pricing is finished." Id.
257. Cf Stephen Labaton, Westlaw and Lexis Near Truce, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,
1988, at D5 (discussing settlement agreement between West and Mead after Eighth
Circuit's decision in Mead); see also Scheffey, supra note 216 (discussing West's set-
tlement with Oasis after district court's decision in Oasis). As a result of West's
victory in Mead, the two parties reached an agreement in which Mead agreed to
pay a large licensing fee for the right to star paginate to West's reporters. See
Labaton, supra, at D5. For a discussion of West's settlement with Oasis, see supra
note 118.
258. Cf Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., No. 94 CIV. 0589, 1997
WL 266972, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1997) (holding that HyperLaw did not violate
West's copyright by copying opinions from West's reporters). While this result
might appear unfair because West has spent a great deal of time and money devel-
oping its reporters, the Supreme Court has held that such a result is "neither un-
fair nor unfortunate. It is the means by which copyright advances the progress of
science and art." Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350
(1991).
259. See Labaton, supra note 257, at D5 (discussing terms of settlement be-
tween Mead and West). While the exact terms of the deal were not disclosed, it is
believed that Mead agreed to pay West "tens of millions of dollars" for the licens-
ing agreement. See id.
260. See Laura Mansnerus, Easing Limits on Legal Publishing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,
1995, at D5 (implying that small publishers could not compete with LEXIS and
West because they feared being sued by West and they could not afford licensing
agreement with West).
261. See Scheffey, supra note 216 ("Prices for legal research are going to go
down, way down."); see alsoJohnston, supra note 255, at D1 ("You are about to see
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competitors, such as HyperLaw and Bender, will be able to produce
cheaper CD-ROM products. 262 Thus, the need for West's reporters will
decrease, causing a drop in subscriptions, which recently were said to ac-
count for about forty percent of West's sales.
263
West will also be collecting less money from computer assisted re-
search. 2 64 Before the Bender decision, other on-line services and sources
on the Internet were almost useless because of the limited number of cases
that were available. 265 Now, other on-line services can copy West's older
cases and increase the viability of their services.26 6 The availability of a
greater number of cases may also allow the Internet to grow into a power-
ful legal research tool, providing the public with "free" access to the
law.
2 6 7
Along with the potentially devastating changes for West, the Bender
decision may also have an enormous impact on the practice of law.
2 68
With increased competition and a greater range of products to choose
from, lawyers and their clients will pay less for legal research. 269 Federal
practice libraries will be more accessible, allowing small firms to afford the
the price of legal research spiral downward. . . .West's monopoly pricing is
finished.").
262. See Scheffey, supra note 216 (comparing price of West's reporters with
price of CD-ROM). For example, a federal practice library, which could cost as
much as $30,000 for new books, are now available electronically for $2000 per year.
See id. The price of state law would be even cheaper, with prices for a state's col-
lected law on CD-ROM priced as low as $600. See id. Greater use of CD-ROMs
would also impact on-line legal research because "lawyers will be able to buy a
single product that has both the reported federal decisions found in books and the
unreported decisions found in online services, such as Westlaw and Lexis." Id.
263. See Iver Peterson, Thomson to Buy Legal Publisher in a $3.43 Billion Cash
Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1996, at D1 (noting that 40% of West's sales come from
subscriptions).
264. See generally Mansnerus, supra note 260, at D5 (explaining that small
database companies stayed away from using citations to West for fear of being
sued). If the Bender decision is upheld, these companies would not have to worry
about a lawsuit and could create a more useful product, giving users alternatives to
Westlaw and LEXIS, which can cost more than $200 an hour. See id. (comparing
price of Westlaw to smaller database company). One company would charge as
little as $6.25 per hour for computer assisted legal research. See id.
265. Cf Scheffey, supra note 216 (discussing problems faced by legal publish-
ers in attempting to compete with West). West's competitors contend that they
were forced to rely on West's cases because copies of older cases, pre-1990, were
"difficult or impossible to obtain from courts in any form." Id. This problem has
been alleviated to some extent for cases decided after 1990 because many courts
have published their opinions in electronic form. See id.
266. See id. (stating ability to link to cases or statutes makes CD-ROMs and
Internet powerful).
267. See id. (stating ability to link to cases and statutes via Internet is powerful
tool for lawyers).
268. SeeJohnston, supra note 255, at DI (stating price of research is going to
decrease).
269. See, e.g., Scheffey, supra note 216 (discussing drop in price of legal
research).
[Vol. 43: p. 873
46
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 4 [1998], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss4/3
1998] NoTE 919
case law necessary for a federal practice. 270 There will be "a more level
research playing field," allowing small firm lawyers to compete with "big-
city Goliaths."27 1 After the Bender decision, one attorney commented,
"'Leveling the playing field... doesn't begin to convey the fundamental
change in the profession .... You start knocking out the high cost of legal
research, and it's going to fundamentally change the way people can
practice.'"272
Finally, Bender may affect the copyright protection afforded future fac-
tual compilations and databases.2 73 Feist limited the protection afforded
compilations by eliminating "sweat of the brow" protection, leaving only
the compilation's selection and arrangement protected.2 74 The Bender de-
cision shows just how limited that protection is and makes it clear that
"'uncreative' but hard working fact-compilers will find it difficult to have
their sweat remunerated." 275 Because Bender and other copyright deci-
sions since Feist have severely reduced copyright protection for factual
compilations, Congress has recently debated the merits of legislation that
would provide greater protection to data compilers like West.
2 7 6
270. See id.; see also Wyman, supra note 5, at 264-65 (stating that CD-ROM tech-
nology allows small firms and sole practitioners that had previously been unable to
afford library of case reporters to access case law).
271. Scheffey, supra note 216.
272. Id.
273. For a discussion of the impact of Bender on the copyright protection af-
forded factual compilations and databases, see infra notes 274-93 and accompany-
ing text.
274. SeeJohn F. Hayden, Copyright Protection of Computer Databases After Feist, 5
HARv. J.L. & TECH. 215, 240 (1991) (arguing that protection is virtually nonexis-
tent after Feist, limited strictly to selection and arrangement). This limited protec-
tion leaves a compilation's most substantial contribution, "the assembly of various
pieces of information into a coherent and useful whole," unprotected. See id.
275. N. Stephan Kinsella & Robert E. Rosenthal, Wither Goes Copyright Law,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 4, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Lglint File.
276. See H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. (1997) (proposing "Collections of Informa-
tion Antipiracy Act); see also H.R. 3531, 104th Cong. (1996) (proposing "Database
Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act of 1996). The 104th Congress
failed to adopt H.R. 3531. See Jonathan Band & John Kennedy, Battle Lines Form
Over WIPO Copyright Bill, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 26, 1998, at C5 (stating that H.R. 3531
died with end of 104th Congress). H.R. 3531 proposed protection for databases
that were "the result of a qualitatively substantial investment of human, technical,
financial or other resources in the collection, assembly, verification, organization
or presentation of the database contents .... . H.R. 3531, 104th Cong., § 3(a)
(1996).
Essentially the proposed act attempted to overrule Feist by giving database pro-
ducers "sweat of the brow" protection. See Wyman, supra note 5, at 257 (discussing
underlying purpose of proposed act). The act would have created a cause of ac-
tion against anyone that used some portion of a protected database's content "in a
manner that conflict[ed] with the database owner's normal exploitation of the
database or adversely affect[ed] the actual or potential market for the database."
H.R. 3531, § 4(a) (1). The proposed act would have also imposed criminal penal-
ties on anyone who violated the act for commercial advantage or who caused "loss
or damage to a database owner aggregating $10,000 or more in any one-year calen-
der period." H.R. 3531, § 8(a).
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House Resolution 2652, the Collections of Information Conspiracy
Act ("Resolution 2652"),277 proposes to extend the Copyright Act of 1976
to cover factual compilations and databases that currently lack protec-
tion.278 The stated purpose of Resolution 2652 is to "prohibit the misap-
propriation of valuable commercial collections of information by
unscrupulous competitors who grab data collected by others, repackage it
and market a product that threatens competitive injury to the original col-
lection." 279 To accomplish this objective, Resolution 2652 proposes to
make it illegal for a party to "misappropriate" compilations of facts that
the owner had compiled by spending substantial amounts of money and
effort, regardless of the originality involved in these compilations.2 80 Res-
olution 2652 also proposes that repeat violators of the law could be subject
to as much as five hundred thousand dollars in fines and possibly even ten
years in prison.281 The great irony of the Bender decision may be that
while it is a case that stands for the proposition that very limited copyright
protection exists for factual compilations, its greatest impact might be that
277. See H.R. 2652, 105th Cong.
278. SeeJodine Mayberry, The Database Antipiracy Act: Friend or Foe of Academic
Freedom?, 15 COMPUTER & ONLINE INDUSTRY LITIGATION REPORTER 7 (1998) (dis-
cussing intentions of H.R. 2652). The act would amend the Copyright Act of 1976
to include a new chapter dealing with collections of information. See id.
279. 143 CONG. REC. E2000-02 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Coble). According to the representative who introduced the bill, it is important to
offer greater protection to compilations because "[ellectronic collections, and
other collections of factual materials, are absolutely indispensable to the American
economy on the verge of the new century." Id. Compilations enable "business
people, professionals, scientists, scholars, and consumers" to retrieve specific fac-
tual information efficiently. See id.
Databases are an ever-growing, vital aspect of the United States economy. See
Hayden, supra note 274, at 215. "The information age of the late twentieth century
has seen the proliferation of factual compilations." Davis, supra note 59, at 439.
The development of factual compilations and databases entails a great deal of ex-
pense and effort on the other hand, copying the final product is very cheap and
easy. See Hayden, supra note 274, at 216. "Databases thus need legal protection
because they are simultaneously difficult to produce and easy to copy." See id.
280. See H.R. 2652, § 1201 (stating "investment[s] of substantial monetary or
other resources" qualify for protection). In proposing this bill, proponents argue
that it is fair because of its reliance on the tort of misappropriation, as opposed to
H.R. 3531, that created a form of sui generis copyright protection for databases.
See 143 CONG. REC. E2000-03 (explaining differences between H.R. 2652 and H.R.
3531). A sui generis law, like copyright law, would give a compiler of factual mate-
rial exclusive ownership of the compilation for a specified period of time. See May-
berry, supra note 278, at 7 (explaining meaning ofsui generis law). H.R. 2652 does
not attempt to establish an exclusive right, it is simply a "prohibition against misap-
propriation." See H.R. 2652, § 1201. But see Band & Kennedy, supra note 276, at C5
(stating that "as a practical matter, H.R. 2652 affords compilers essentially the
same level of protection as its sui generis predecessors").
281. See Mayberry, supra note 278, at 7 (describing penalties proscribed by
H.R. 2652). First offenders could be subject to a fine of up to $250,000 and five
years in jail. See id.
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it is the impetus for legislation that would substantially enhance such
protection.
282
Obviously, large data collectors like West strongly support this pro-
posed legislation. 283 They argue that there is a great need for such legisla-
tive action, both economically and scientifically. 284 According to the
argument in favor of Resolution 2652, data compilers need incentives and
profit protection to maintain data collection as worthy of the time and
effort that the collectors expend.285 The proponents argue that if these
incentives do not exist, then no one would be willing to undertake the task
of compiling large databases.28 6
The opponents of Resolution 2652, including smaller publishers, edu-
cational institutions and libraries, argue that the proposed legislation
would eliminate competition and drive up the costs of research. 28 7 Addi-
tionally, they argue that Resolution 2652 would have a "chilling effect on
282. See generally H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. (1997) (making it illegal to "misap-
propriate collections of information"). Alan D. Sugerman, president of HyperLaw
has stated that "the raison d'etre for this bill is to protect the case reports of West
Publishing and Lexis." Thomas Scheffey, Congress Debates Law Guarding Against
Electronic "Piracy," TEXAS LAWYER, Nov. 10, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Txlawr File (quoting statement of Alan D. Sugerman, president of HyperLaw,
Inc.). While Sugerman's charge is debatable, it is clear that Bender and similar
lower court decisions are some of the main reasons for the proposed legislation.
See id. (stating that bill is response to pressure from two fronts, Bender decision and
directive of European Union). In February 1996, the European Union issued a
directive to its member nations, instructing them to enact database protection laws
by Dec. 31, 1997. See id. The directive also stated that "[floreign nations without
equivalent' database protection laws may not be protected in Europe." Id.
283. See Mayberry, supra note 278, at 7 (noting that bill is strongly supported
by database publishers and their trade organizations). Trade organizations sup-
port the bill because the database industry employs over 200,000 workers nation-
wide. See id.
284. Cf 143 CONG. REc. E2000-02 (stating that there is need for "legislation to
protect developers who place their materials in interstate commerce against piracy
and unfair competition," thereby encouraging investment in production and dis-
tribution of valuable information). Essentially, the argument is that the best way
to promote science and the economy, of which databases are an important part, is
to protect these compilations. Cf id.
285. Cf Scheffey, supra note 282 (stating that proponents of bill claim that it
is essential to keep data collection profitable).
286. Cf id. ("It is better to have one provider than zero."). Proponents of the
bill argue that the lack of protection, since Feist, has led to a slowing in the growth
of the database, electronic publishing, on-line and information retrieval industry.
See Mayberry, supra note 278, at 7. If data collectors lose their economic incentive
to create compilations, there is a real chance that no one will be there to take their
places. For a discussion of this possibility, see infra note 293.
287. See Mayberry, supra note 278, at 7 (noting that bill has created concern
among scientists, journalists, academics and librarians). Librarians, for example,
feel that the bill will drive up acquisition costs, limiting the amount of information
that they can make available to students. See id. Overall, the opponents of the bill
believe that it "will only add a legal barrier that will facilitate monopoly pricing and
foster a substantial risk that large commercial providers will gradually control all of
the building blocks of knowledge." Id.
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the full and open exchange of data for research and education [al] pur-
poses."2 88 Finally, the opponents see the proposed legislation as a danger
to the viability of the public domain in general.2 89 They believe Resolu-
tion 2652, if enacted, will establish a dangerous precedent in which every
investor, in any number of products, would seek similar statutory protec-
tion for their profits. 290 The overall effect of such requests would be to
"eliminate the public domain and discourage new uses for collected
information." 2
9 1
While the potential results of the Bender decision, lowering the cost of
legal research and increasing the public's access to the law, are welcomed,
and the opponents of Resolution 2652 present a valid concern in protect-
ing the continued viability of the public domain, one intriguing question
remains: if West and other compilers of data lose their monopoly and
profits, thereby losing their economic incentive to undertake their valua-
ble work, 29 2 who will be willing to take their place?293
Vito Petretti
288. Id.
289. See id. (discussing possible effects on existence of public domain mate-
rial). Opponents argue that the bill's exemption is not enough protection as cur-
rently worded. See id. They argue that the bill should be changed to "ensure that
governmental works cannot be copyrighted and thus removed from the public do-
main." Id. Currently, the bill would protect a private publisher who simply re-
packages governmental information, even without significant contribution of its
own. See id. (describing argument of opposition to H.R. 2652). Another problem
that certain groups have with the bill is that they claim that the definition of
database is overly broad. See id. As a result of this broad definition, the proposed
act could "conceivably cover every information product now freely available from
the public domain." Id.
290. See id. ("The proposed law would open the door for investors in a myriad
of products and processes to demand the same kind of protections for their profits
. . . . .).
291. Id.
292. See Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., No. 94 CIV. 0589, 1997
WL 266972, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1997) (stating that West "performs a valuable
service for the bench and the bar").
293. Cf Stephen C. Carlson, The Law and Economics of Star Pagination, 2 GEO.
MASON L. Rmv. 421, 429 (1995) (discussing effect of removing author's monopoly
protection). In general, removing an author's right to exclusive work will result in
the author not being able to make a profit for two reasons:
First, the price per copy does not include the initial fixed cost to produce
it. Second, the demand for the author's copy will decrease because of the
competing copies. In addition, the copyist does not bear the risk of fail-
ure in producing the work, because only the popular works tend to be
pirated. The effect is to reduce the incentive to write the book in the first place.
Id. (emphasis added).
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